Fragmented Property Systems by Fitzpatrick, Daniel
  
 
137 
FRAGMENTED PROPERTY SYSTEMS 
 
DANIEL FITZPATRICK* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article considers fragmented property systems – the phe-
nomenon of contested, separated or overlapping sub-systems within 
a national property jurisdiction.  One example is circumstances of 
property despite law.  Globally, as many as a billion people claim 
de facto property without recognition by law in urban informal set-
tlements and agro-pastoral or forested areas.  Another example is 
property without transition to law.  Many households in the devel-
oping world regulate land markets through local mechanisms not-
withstanding opportunities or requirements to use law.  The article 
provides a conceptual frame for the emergence of property system 
fragmentation based on the private coordination of property rela-
tions.  The article argues that fragmentation emerges in complex 
property systems where law attempts to displace property coordina-
tion mechanisms, but fails to induce a critical mass of property par-
ticipants to alter coordination strategies.  A focus on coordination 
provides a means to combine the methodological individualism of 
economic narratives with collective variables highlighted by other 
perspectives on property such as anthropology and complex sys-
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
There are two basic economic accounts of property transitions: 
Demsetzian and public choice.1  Demsetzian narratives analyze the 
cost/benefit calculations of resource users.2  Property crystallizes as 
a response to the benefits of exclusion and the costs of open access. 
This is an optimistic view of the evolution of property as a product 
of changed economic circumstances.3  In contrast, public choice 
narratives describe property transitions through the exercise of po-
litical power.4  Unless there are countervailing political pressures, 
individuals who hold political power will choose property rules, and 
allocate property rights, to maximize their own benefits rather than 
the welfare of the society as a whole.5  This is a skeptical or pessi-
                                                          
1 See Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 181 (2003) (observing that for every efficiency-based explanation “there is an 
alternative and skeptical view that is interest group, or politically, driven”); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S515, S543–44 (2002) (“Demsetz's basic efficiency story is tempered with a 
healthy dose of public choice theory”).  James Krier makes a related distinction 
between autonomous and intentional design accounts of the origins of property.  
See James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL 
L. REV. 139, 151 (2009) (discussing the various accounts of the origins of the social 
practice of individual ownership); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT 
LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 137–40 (1991) (discussing property in 
terms of distinctions between legal centralism and property without law) [herein-
after ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW]; see generally Saul Levmore, Two Stories 
About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421 (2002) (providing an 
overview of Demsetzian and public choice accounts). 
2See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. 
ECON. HIST. 16, 25 (1973) (providing applications of Demsetz’s thesis and discuss-
ing the enclosure movement in twelfth—and thirteenth—century England); see 
also ESTER BOSERUP, THE CONDITIONS OF AGRICULTURAL GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF 
AGRARIAN CHANGE UNDER POPULATION PRESSURE (1965); YUJIRO HAYAMI & MASAO 
KIKUCHI, ASIAN VILLAGE ECONOMY AT THE CROSSROADS: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 
TO INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1981); see generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 347 (1967).   
3 See Levmore, supra note 1, at 182 (“The Demsetz-style story… is at root 
quite optimistic”). 
4 See Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 
S359, S361 (2002) (stating that political action and changes in property regimes 
moved towards efficiency); see also, ITAI SENED, THE POLITICAL INSTITUTION OF 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1997), at 33–50 (ascribing evolution of property to political in-
stitutions); Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of 
Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (2005) (discussing politics of property rights 
in US fisheries). 
5 See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, Institutions as a 
Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, 1 HANDBOOK ECON. GROWTH 368, 427 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/3
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mistic view of property transitions that may involve the exclusion 
of Demsetzian claimants.6 
Optimistic Demsetzian accounts appear simplistic when tested 
against the reality of property informality in many parts of the 
world today.7  Almost a billion people live in urban settlements on 
land legally owned by others.8  Hundreds of millions live on land 
claimed by the state in agricultural, pastoral and forested areas.9  
Many claim property despite law – a fact illustrated by long-term 
acts of residence, use and exclusion.  Even for households with de 
jure rights to land, a remarkable number—as much as 80% in some 
jurisdictions—continues to regulate transfers of land through sub-
state processes even though law mandates registration of title trans-
fers in a national cadastral system.10  All these cases manifest the 
evolution of property through a broad fragmentation of de facto and 
de jure property sub-systems.  State actors have a limited capacity 
to enforce de jure rules or rights against de facto property claims; 
de facto claimants are engaging in various strategies of resistance to 
legal rules or de jure rights; and significant numbers of de jure 
claimants follow de facto methods of land administration. 
On its face, the phenomenon of fragmented de jure and de facto 
property systems has a simple public choice explanation.  Political 
incentives may produce laws that deny de jure recognition to large 
numbers of occupiers or users of land.  Because state actors may 
accrue private benefits from the allocation of de jure property 
rights, without incurring private costs of enforcement, there are in-
centives to allocate de jure rights to persons other than local Dem-
setzian claimants.11  Yet, while public choice analysis may explain 
                                                                                                                                    
(2005) (“[E]conomic institutions that enforce property rights or protect against 
state predation may not be in the interest of a ruler who wants to appropriate as-
sets") [hereinafter “Acemoglu et al., Institutions”]. 
6 See Levmore, supra note 1, at S423 (stating the public choice story “is about 
interest groups and is potentially pessimistic”). 
7 See, e.g., Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: 
The Third World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 Yale L. J. 996 (2006) (arguing that 
the Demsetz thesis does not explain chronic Third World property contests); see 
also KLAUS DEININGER, WORLD BANK, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY 
REDUCTION 9 (2003) (“[T]here are many cases where the virtuous cycle of in-
creased scarcity of land leading to more precise definition of property rights has 
not materialized, but instead conflict has arisen.”) 
8 See infra Section 2.1. 
9 See infra Section 2 (providing examples). 
10 See infra Section 2.1. 
11 See Lee J. Alston et al, The Development of Property Rights on Frontiers: En-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
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the legal exclusion of Demsetzian claims, it does not explain re-
sponses to law by Demsetzian claimants.  Why do some Demsetzi-
an claimants choose to resist or ignore law?  In what circumstances 
do Demsetzian claimants submit to law, even where the law denies 
their property claims?  How and why do Demsetzian claims persist 
notwithstanding law?  While public choice narratives provide a 
framework to analyze the political design of property rules, they do 
not provide a comprehensive account of responses to rules—the 
everyday acts of resistance, ignorance or accommodation that help 
to constitute a complex, multi-scale property system. 
This article develops a conceptual frame for the emergence of 
property system fragmentation that moves beyond Demsetzian and 
public choice narratives of property transitions.  Property systems 
are not fragmented where a critical mass of people coordinates 
property relations directly or indirectly on the basis of law, either 
because law provides space for private coordination mechanisms, or 
because law induces or facilitates alterations in private strategies of 
property coordination.  Conversely, property system fragmentation 
emerges where law attempts to displace or standardize private co-
ordination mechanisms, but a critical mass chooses to retain prior 
coordination strategies.  The implication is that critical mass re-
sponses to law are a key variable in the evolution of property sys-
tems.  If a critical mass of Demsetzian claimants were to submit or 
resort to property law, there would be little or no fragmentation of 
de facto and de jure property sub-systems.  Proprietary claimants 
would coordinate expectations of respect for property either on the 
basis of law, or on the basis of coordination mechanisms recognized 
by law.  However, if Demsetzian claimants choose not to submit or 
resort to law, and law attempts but fails to displace their systems of 
property coordination, the consequence is chronic fragmentation of 
de facto and de jure property sub-systems so long as (1) the state is 
not willing or able to enforce law, and (2) transaction costs prevent 
agreements among de facto and de jure property claimants. 
A focus on coordinating property relations highlights the need 
for conceptual approaches to property system fragmentation that 
encompass not only individual decision-making but also collective 
processes of social organization.12  The methodological individual-
                                                                                                                                    
dowments, Norms and Politics, 72 J. OF  ECON. HIST. 741, 750 (2012) (showing that in 
all of the cases de jure property rights were granted without enforcement mecha-
nisms in place). 
12 See Katharina Pistor, Contesting Property Rights: Towards an Integrated Theory 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/3
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ism of economic analysis provides a means to analyze decisions 
that prefer alternative coordination arrangements to law (and vice 
versa).  However, coordination also requires techniques of legitima-
tion—the use of ritual, symbolism and myth to maintain the social 
basis for expectations of coordinated behavior.  Coordination impli-
cates the epistemology of property—the understanding of acts such 
as possession or the legitimacy of law.  Coordination takes place at 
different scales of interaction—within and across systems of family, 
group and state ordering.  Coordination may even involve distinct 
sub-systems with their own imperatives and processes for self-
organization.  In all these senses, complex problems such as proper-
ty system fragmentation require macro-analytical frames beyond 
the cost/benefit calculations of individual actors.13  Under a broad 
rubric of coordination analysis, therefore, this article identifies ways 
in which insights derived from anthropology and complex systems 
theory may replace, supplement or modify the methodological indi-
vidualism of economic explanations for fragmented property sys-
tems. 
The article proceeds as follows.  Part 2 begins by describing 
property system fragmentation in the developing world.  The focus 
is property in land.  The contemporary reality of many developing 
countries is not Demsetzian evolution to well-defined private prop-
erty, but a broad bifurcation of de jure and de facto property sub-
systems relating to land.  Part I then argues that neither a Demsetzi-
an focus on incentives to claim or delineate property, nor a public 
choice focus on the political design of property rules, explains the 
emergence of chronic property system fragmentation.  Part 3 sets 
out case studies of property system fragmentation from East Timor, 
Kenya and Cambodia.  The case studies generate the premise that 
property system fragmentation develops when law attempts to dis-
place private coordination mechanisms, but fails to induce a critical 
                                                                                                                                    
of Institutional and System Change, 11(2) GLOBAL JURIST 2 (2011) (arguing that the 
micro-perspectives of new institutional economics do not explain adequately mac-
ro-aspects of contests among property rights). 
13 As with other types of “wicked problems”, the phenomenon of property 
system fragmentation involves issues of scale, persistence and complexity that 
militate against mono-disciplinary perspectives.  See Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin 
M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4 POL’Y SCI. 155, 160–69 
(1973) (introducing multi-faceted concept of wicked problems); see also JEFF 
CONKLIN, DIALOGUE MAPPING: BUILDING SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF WICKED 
PROBLEMS 3–40 (John Wiley & Sons Ltd. eds., 2006) (discussing trans-disciplinary 
approaches to wicked problems). 
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mass of property participants to alter coordination strategies.  
Whether or not a critical mass of citizens adopts law as a basis for 
property coordination turns on a range of variables, not only indi-
vidual calculations of the costs and benefits of law, but also collec-
tive processes of social organization.  The analysis provides insights 
into the comparative paths of property systems.  The article con-
cludes with comments on the implications of property system frag-
mentation for the design of law. 
 
2.  THE PHENOMENON OF FRAGMENTED PROPERTY SYSTEMS 
 
2.1.  Property Without Law: Slums, Forests and Agriculture 
 
There is a global phenomenon of fragmented property systems.  
In 2012, around 862,000 people lived in urban informal settle-
ments.14  Typically, the state or private parties have legal ownership 
of their land.  Yet, while there are many cases of forced evictions, 
many others involve long-term acts of occupation notwithstanding 
law.15  For example, a survey of Kolkata, India, in 2003 found that 
over 40% of slum residents had occupied their land for two genera-
tions or more.16  Similarly, in rural areas there are estimates that at 
least a billion people lack secure rights to land.17  Many, if not most, 
                                                          
14 See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, STATE OF THE 
WORLD’S CITIES 2012/2013: PROSPERITY OF CITIES 151 (2013); see also U.N. Secretary-
General, Road Map towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Dec-
laration, Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/56/326 (Sept. 6, 2001) (describ-
ing a Millennium Development Goal target of improving the lives of slum dwell-
ers inter alia through security of land tenure). 
U.N. INTER-AGENCY EXPERT AND ADVISORY GROUP ON MDG INDICATORS, 
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS INDICATORS (2002) (establishing a Millennium 
Development Goal of improving the lives of slum dwellers through security of 
land tenure). 
15 See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME & UNITED NATIONS 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC, THE STATE OF ASIAN 
CITIES 2010/11, 126, 162 (2010) (stating that UN-HABITAT provides an estimate of 
2,090,772 cases of evictions in 2005 alone).  While in absolute terms this figure is 
very large indeed, it is relatively small compared to the total number of informal 
landholders in the world today. 
16 UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, THE CHALLENGE OF 
SLUMS: GLOBAL REPORT ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 213 (2003).  
17 See ROY L. PROSTERMAN, ROBERT MITCHELL & TIM HANSTAD, ONE BILLION 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/3
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live in areas claimed as state forest land or, more recently, as state 
land that is subject to large-scale grants to agribusiness interests.  
Yet here too many rural residents are not subject to eviction, or oth-
er forms of enforcement of law, while claiming rights to land on the 
basis of generational use or occupation, or purchase through infor-
mal land markets.18  Thus, the global phenomenon of property in-
formality is also a puzzle of property despite law – where those that 
the state classifies as “squatters” still engage in property-like activi-
ty.  The following Part provides examples from urban, forest and 
agrarian areas of the developing world. 
Urban informal settlements may develop where a de jure land-
owner enters into agreements to provide housing on land, but there 
is no de jure recognition of the property rights of householders due 
to a lack of permission for the subdivision, or violations of zoning, 
planning or construction rules.19  The householders hold personal 
rights against the landowner, but may have no lawful proprietary 
interests in the land.  Alternatively, the informal settlement devel-
ops through construction of houses on vacant land without permis-
sion from the owner of the land, such that the householders have no 
de jure rights to the land at all.20  In both cases, there is evidence 
that many, if not most, households develop expectations of proprie-
tary or property-like entitlements, even in circumstances where they 
acknowledge the formal illegality of their claims.21  One example is 
a study of informal urban settlements in Bandung, Indonesia, where 
76.4% of respondents who identified their landholding as illegal al-
so stated there was no possibility of eviction by the government, 
with 36.8% claiming the basis for their perceptions of property as 
long-term occupation, and a further 47.2% identifying their posses-
sion of documentation evidencing residence on land (e.g. utility 
bills, land tax receipts, sales contracts or letters from local govern-
                                                                                                                                    
RISING: LAW, LAND AND THE ALLEVIATION OF GLOBAL POVERTY (2009).  
18 Id. at 6–8. 
19 See Geoffrey Payne & Alain Durand-Lasserve, Holding On: Security of Ten-
ure—Types, Policies, Practices and Challenges, RESEARCH PAPER PREPARED FOR THE 
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON ADEQUATE HOUSING AS A COMPONENT OF THE RIGHT TO AN 
ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING, AND ON THE RIGHT TO NON-DISCRIMINATION IN THIS 
CONTEXT 17 (2012) (discussing different types of settlement typologies). 
20 Id. at 17. 
21 See UN-HABITAT, CHALLENGE OF SLUMS, supra note 16, at 60; see generally 
A. Durand-Lasserve, Informal Settlements and the MDGs: Global Policy Debates on 
Property Ownership and Security of Tenure, GLOBAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT MAGAZINE, 
Mar., 2006, at1. 
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ment officials).22  In Indonesia, these documents operate as a mech-
anism to coordinate property transfers, even though they are not 
necessarily recognized as evidence of rights in law.23 
Tropical forests provide a similar story of divergence between 
de jure rules and de facto property claims to land.  Based on a sur-
vey of 52 countries, the Rights and Resources Institute estimates 
that 73% of the global forest area is classified as forest land admin-
istered by governments.24  Aside from protected forest reserves, 
most government-administered forests are legally subject to conces-
sions granted to commercial forestry or agribusiness interests.25  
Only 14.5% of the global forest area is owned by, or designated for, 
local communities and indigenous peoples.26  Yet, while global fig-
ures are unavailable, there is little doubt that local communities and 
indigenous peoples habitually occupy or use much more than 14.5% 
of the global forest area without de jure recognition of proprietary 
claims.27  For example, Indonesia’s 1967 Basic Forestry Law classi-
                                                          
22 See GUSTAAF REERINK, TENURE SECURITY FOR INDONESIA’S URBAN POOR: A 
SOCIO-LEGAL STUDY ON LAND, DECENTRALISATION AND THE RULE OF LAW IN 
BANDUNG, 216–17 (2011). 
23 See RAYMOND J. STRUYK, MICHAEL L. HOFFMAN & HAROLD M. KATSURA, THE 
MARKET FOR SHELTER IN INDONESIAN CITIES 93–95 (1990) (discussing different types 
of ad-hoc property documents used in Indonesia). 
24 See WASHINGTON D.C.: RIGHTS AND RESOURCES INITIATIVE, WHAT FUTURE FOR 
REFORM? PROGRESS AND SLOWDOWN IN FOREST TENURE REFORM SINCE 2002, 16–17 
(2014) (defining “land administered by governments” to include all land that is 
legally claimed as exclusively belonging to the state, areas where community 
rights are limited to basic access or withdrawal rights that can be extinguished le-
gally with relative ease by the state, and forest land awarded under concessions 
where the state retains legal ownership).  
25 Id. at 17. 
26 Id. at 17 (showing that around 11.5% of the global forest area is legally 
owned by private individuals and corporations).  
27 See, e.g., Peter Dorner & William C. Thiesenhusen, Land Tenure and Defor-
estation: Interactions and Environmental Implications (U.N. Research Inst. for Soc. 
Dev., Discussion Paper No. 34, 1992) (demonstrating that proxy evidence may be 
found in the broad literature on forest conflicts between local groups and state 
agencies); see generally Robert Mendelsohn, Property Rights and Tropical Deforesta-
tion, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 750 (1994).  For more specific regional studies, see 
CONFLICT OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (Lim 
Teck Ghee & Mark J. Valencia eds., 1990) (focusing on the Pacific and South-East 
Asia region); see also OWEN J. LYNCH & KIRK TALBOTT, BALANCING ACTS: 
COMMUNITY-BASED FOREST MANAGEMENT AND NATIONAL LAW IN ASIA AND THE 
PACIFIC (Marshali S. Berdan ed.,1995) (focusing on the greater Asia region); 
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL FORESTRY RESEARCH, MUNICIPAL FOREST MANAGEMENT 
IN LATIN AMERICA (Lyès Ferroukhi ed., 2003) (focusing on the South America and 
Caribbean region). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/3
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fied almost 70% of the archipelago as state forest land.28  Estimates 
of the numbers of long-term residents of state forest areas range 
from 35 to 90 million.  Estimates of the number of people living in 
forest areas allocated to private concession-holders range from 40 
to 60 million people.29  Similarly, in Thailand, as many as 15 mil-
lion people live without de jure rights in state forest areas that cover 
45% of the land mass of Thailand.30  In both Indonesia and Thailand 
there are reports of widespread forest conflicts and contests over at-
tempts at enforcement of law by the state or concessionaires.31  
However, there are also very large numbers of long-term occupiers 
of state forest land that have not been subjected to attempts at evic-
tion.  Many of these landholders also appear to have Demsetzian 
perceptions of property entitlements that go beyond mere licenses 
to occupy, revocable at will by the state.  Yet, they too lack the 
benefit of de jure recognition of their claims. 
As to agricultural areas, the NGO Grain estimates on the basis 
of national census data that small farms hold less than 25% of the 
world’s farmland, even though they constitute over 90% of all 
farms worldwide.32  The balance is lawfully held either by corporate 
                                                          
28 Basic Forestry Law, 5/1967, Art. 5 (Indon.); see also MARCUS COLCHESTER ET 
AL, THE APPLICATION OF FSC PRINCIPLES 2 & 3 IN INDONESIA: OBSTACLES AND 
POSSIBILITIES 10–25 (2003) (describing the way in which the Indonesian govern-
ment relied on the state’s right to control land to classify most of the archipelago 
as state forest land). 
29 ARNALDO CONTRERAS-HERMISILLA, FOREST TRENDS & CHIP FAY, 
STRENGTHENING FOREST MANAGEMENT IN INDONESIA THROUGH LAND TENURE 
REFORM: ISSUES AND FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 16 (2005).  
30 See generally Jason Lubanski, Land is Life: A Policy Advocacy Case Study of the 
Northern Thailand Land Reform Movement 15 (Capstone Collection, Paper 2565, 
2012) (citing Editorial, Setting out to Replant Forests, BANGKOK POST, March 2, 2012; 
XAVIER GINE, WORLD BANK, LAND SECURITY IN RURAL THAILAND: EVIDENCE FROM A 
PROPERTY RIGHTS REFORM 4 (2005); see also USAID, THAILAND: PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND RESOURCE GOVERNANCE PROFILE 10 (2010) (estimating that 12 million people 
live in Thailand’s forests); Jeanette Clarke, Trends in Forest Ownership, Forest Re-
source Tenure and Institutional Arrangements: Are They Contributing to Better Forest 
Management and Poverty Reduction? (FAO, Forestry Policy and Institutions Work-
ing Paper No. 14, 12, 2006) (providing an estimate of 1.3 million households in de-
clared forest areas – the majority of which live in conservation forests).  
31 See J.Y. CAMPBELL, DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN 
INDONESIA, IN WHICH WAY FORWARD? PEOPLE, FORESTS, AND POLICYMAKING IN 
INDONESIA 110–25 (C.J.P. Colfer & I.A.P. Resosudarmo eds., 2002); see also JOHN F. 
MCCARTHY, DECENTRALIZATION, LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND FOREST MANAGEMENT IN 
BARITO SELATAN DISTRICT, CENTRAL KALIMANTAN (2001); GINE, supra note 30, at 4; 
USAID, supra note 30, at 10. 
32 See GRAIN, HUNGRY FOR LAND: SMALL FARMERS FEED THE WORLD WITH LESS 
THAN A QUARTER OF ALL FARMLAND 5–6 (2014) (providing an in-depth look into 
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interests or directly by the state itself.  In Africa, almost 90% of all 
farms are family-owned, but family farms have legal rights to less 
than 15% of total farmland.33  Grain comments that small farms in 
Africa are probably using much more than 15% of total farmland as 
national census data do not include landholdings in areas designated 
as state-owned or land lawfully owned by others.34  There is also a 
well-documented trend away from legal recognition of ownership 
of land by family farms as a result of increased global demand for 
food and agribusiness products.35  Since the 1960s, approximately 
140,000,000 ha of land—an area equivalent to the total farmland of 
the European Union—has been transferred to commercial soy bean, 
oil palm, rape seed and sugarcane plantations.36  The World Bank 
identifies grants of concessions or ownership of around 56,000,000 
ha of farmland for large-scale agribusiness projects between 2008 
and 2010.37  More than half were in Africa, with grants from 2004 
to 2009 of 3,965,000 ha in Sudan and 2,670,000 ha in Mozambique 
alone.38  At the same time, the World Bank estimates around 21% 
of announced large-scale agricultural deals from 2008 to 2011 had 
not commenced cultivation.39 
There are no global figures on the numbers of people living on 
land granted to large-scale agribusiness concerns.  The number and 
scale of agribusiness grants that have not commenced production, 
or overlap with areas of community land, suggest that considerable 
numbers remain on land notwithstanding the allocation of de jure 
property rights to another person or entity.40  For example, there are 
                                                                                                                                    
small farmers and their decreasing proportional share of farmland); see also SARAH 
K. LOWDER, JAKOB SKOET & SAUMYA SINGH, WHAT DO WE REALLY KNOW ABOUT THE 
NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS AND FAMILY FARMS IN THE WORLD? 8 (2014) 
(showing another estimate is that family farms constitute 70% of the world’s 
farms).  
33 GRAIN, supra note 32, at 6–7. 
34 Id. at 7.  
35 Id. at 10.  See also LORENZO COTULA, LAND ‘GRABBING’ IN THE SHADOW OF THE 
LAW: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS REGULATING THE GLOBAL LAND RUSH, reprinted in THE 
CHALLENGE OF FOOD SECURITY: INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORKS (Rosemary Rayfuse and Nicole Weisfelt eds., 2012).  
36 GRAIN, supra note 32, at 9.  
37 KLAUS DEININGER ET AL., RISING GLOBAL INTEREST IN FARMLAND: CAN IT 
YIELD SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE BENEFITS? XIV, XXXII (2011). 
38 Id. at XXXIII; Id. at XXXII (stating that approximately two-thirds of all 
large-scale agricultural land grants were in Africa alone). 
39 Id. at XIV.  
40 Id. at 63 (“[I]n many of the cases studied, investors acquired land in quanti-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/3
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estimates that production has not commenced on around 12 million 
ha of land allocated worldwide to oil palm interests.41  In Mozam-
bique, a 2009 audit concluded that 34% of all agribusiness projects 
had not commenced production.42  In Sudan, agribusiness land 
grabs reportedly encompassed entire villages.43  In Zambia, survey 
data indicate that land granted for agribusiness projects overlaps 
significantly with areas used for shifting cultivation.44  In Mozam-
bique, there are over 418 cases covering 1.4 million hectares of land 
where grants to investors overlap with areas delimited as communi-
ty land.45  On the basis of regression analysis, the World Bank iden-
tifies a correlation between poor quality recognition of rural rights 
to land and the attractiveness of a jurisdiction for large-scale agri-
business projects.46  In all cases, poor quality cadastral data exacer-
bate the potential for overlaps between de facto and de jure claims 
to land.47  
 
                                                                                                                                    
ties much larger than they could use, at least initially.”); see also id. at 98 (“In al-
most all cases, land…  targeted for investment is subject to… overlapping rights 
held by communities, individuals, [or] the state.”). 
41 Id. at 20–21 (citing Joseph Fargione, et al., Land Clearing and the Biofuel Car-
bon Debt, 319 SCI. 1235, 1235–38 (2008)). 
42 Id. at 62 (discussing a land audit taken from a sample of projects); see also 
A. LOCKE, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF LARGE-SCALE LAND ACQUISITION 
FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN MOZAMBIQUE (2009) (discussing the effect of 
large-scale land acquisitions on food security and poverty). 
43 DEININGER, supra note 37, at 60 (discussing the effect of having “limited at-
tention to identifying existing rights” in Sudan). 
44 Id. at 61 (discussing the consequence of schematically drawing bounda-
ries); see also WORLD BANK, AWAKENING AFRICA’S SLEEPING GIANT: PROSPECTS FOR 
COMPETITIVE COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE IN THE GUINEA SAVANNAH ZONE AND 
BEYOND (2009) (analyzing the feasibility of using the identification of products and 
production systems to increase commercial agricultural competitiveness). 
45 The number of overlapping or contested land tenure cases in Mozambique 
may be substantially higher as only 12% of all communities have received formal 
delimitation of their legal title to land.  See DEININGER, supra note 37, at 61; see also 
LOCKE, supra note 42, at 25 (discussing the reasons why it is problematic that land 
under formalized DUATS was considered as not potentially available in a zoning 
exercise). 
46 DEININGER, supra note 37, at 55 (correlating negative rural land recognition 
with the percentage of implemented projects). 
47 Id. at 58–60, 117 (illustrating the challenges with collecting inventory data). 
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2.2.  Property at Scale: Localized Entitlements 
 
Demsetzian property claims may not receive recognition from 
the state, but they may benefit from acknowledgement at local 
scales of governance.  Local acknowledgement helps to transform a 
property claim into de facto property (or quasi-property)—
involving third-party perceptions of proprietary entitlement not-
withstanding a lack of recognition by law.48  Even in the absence of 
de jure entitlements, there is evidence that property-like claims 
supported by localized governance mechanisms may provide suffi-
cient perceptions of security from appropriation or encroachment 
for investments in available forms of technology.49  For example, a 
number of studies of customary tenure find correlations between 
community-acknowledged proprietary entitlements to land and in-
vestment in observable land improvements, including building 
houses, planting economic trees or crops, applying fertilizer, de-
stumping and terracing, and fencing off plots.50  In Ghana, there 
was no difference in investment outcomes for land subject to land 
                                                          
48 See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (C.K. Ogden ed., 
Richard Hildreth trans., 1931 [1802]) (“Property and law are born together, and 
die together.  Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and 
property ceases”).  This type of law-centric conception of property implies that at 
most local recognition of proprietary entitlements creates quasi-property or prop-
erty-like effects.  While implicitly disputing the legal centralist view that denies 
the possibility of property without law, this article does not necessarily require 
definitive conclusion as to the definitional scope of property and its relationship 
with law as it focuses on fragmentation – the phenomenon of chronic contests, 
overlaps or disconnections involving proprietary claims.  The question of whether 
to describe locally acknowledged property claims as quasi-property or property 
does not remove the core question of how chronic property system fragmentation 
develops. 
49 DEININGER, supra note 7, at 52–53 (discussing community ownership of land 
in some African, Latin American and Asian countries, such as Mexico and Gua-
temala);  see also Michael Trebilcock & Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and Develop-
ment: The Contingent Case for Formalization, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 397, 416–17 (2008) 
(discussing empirical evidence for formalist and informalist perspectives). 
50 See KEIJIRO OTSUKA & FRANK PLACE, LAND TENURE AND NATURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF AGRARIAN COMMUNITIES IN ASIA AND 
AFRICA 1–21 (2001) (discussing background research and the theoretical frame-
work for the land tenure study); DEININGER, supra note 7, at 47; see generally DAVID 
A. ATWOOD, LAND REGISTRATION IN AFRICA: THE IMPACT ON AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTION, 18 WORLD DEV. 659, 659–71 (1990) (illustrating negative consequenc-
es of land titling and potential cheaper alternatives); JOHN W. BRUCE & SHEM E. 
MIGOT-ADHOLLA, SEARCHING FOR LAND TENURE SECURITY IN AFRICA (1994) (discuss-
ing the security of land tenure systems in Africa). 
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titles and land governed by customary mechanisms alone.51  In 
Rwanda, the variable most strongly correlated with investment in 
land improvements was the right to bequeath land through custom-
ary mechanisms, rather than the right to sell land outside the clan 
group.52 
In urban informal settlements, there is proxy evidence that resi-
dents may also invest in housing, or transact rights to land, on the 
basis of perceptions of proprietary entitlements acknowledged by 
other members of their settlement.  For example, in Vietnam less 
than 25% of all residential land had been registered by 2006.53  Yet, 
as at 2006, there was a booming market for urban residential land 
even in the absence of registered land titles.54  In East Timor, there 
is still no Land Law twelve years after independence, but there is a 
thriving urban market for house sales and condominium develop-
ments.55  In São Paulo, Brazil, 78% of surveyed favela residents 
stated that they owned their dwellings, even though typically a fave-
                                                          
51 See generally Timothy Besley, Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theo-
ry and Evidence from Ghana, 103 J. POL. ECON. 903 (1995) (discussing the correlation 
of property rights and investment incentives in Ghana). 
52 See Shem Migot-Adholla et al., Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-
Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?, 5 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 155, 166–67 
(1991) (discussing the benefit to land improvements of land that has been be-
queathed); see also F. Place & P. Hazell, Productivity Effects of Indigenous Land Ten-
ure Systems in Sub Saharan Africa, 75 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 10, 14 (1993) (discussing a 
positive correlation between land rights and land improvements in Rwanda). 
53 See Tran Nhu Trung, et. al., Shaping the Change: Vietnam Land Registration 
from Terminology to the Practice, XXIII FIG CONGRESS 12 (October 8–13, 2006), 
https://www.fig.net/resources/proceedings/fig_proceedings/fig2006/papers/t
s39/ts39_03_trannhu_etal_0500.pdf (last visited July 8, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/GLB8-TUEE] (discussing the progression of land registration 
in Vietnam). 
54 WORLD BANK, VIETNAM BUSINESS: VIETNAM DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 45–46, 
No. 34474-VN (Nov. 30, 2005), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/12/02/000160016_
20051202141324/Rendered/PDF/344740VN.pdf (last visited July 8, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/BXS8-ZN5D] (illustrating that the “real estate market 
emerged, and boomed, despite incomplete legal titling”). 
55 The President of East Timor (Timor-Leste) refused to promulgate a draft 
land law approved by the National Parliament in March 2012.  See Warren 
Wright, President Horta Sends Land Law Back to Parliament, TIMOR-LESTE L. & JUST. 
BULL. (Mar. 24, 2012),  http://www.easttimorlawandjusticebulletin.com/2012/
03/president-horta-sends-land-law-back-to.html?spref=bl [https://perma.cc/
254X-AKUW].  The Council of Ministers approved a further draft land law on 
March 29, 2016.  The National Parliament is slated to consider the draft law later 
in 2016.  See MÉABH CRYAN, QUICK GUIDE TO THE CHANGES IN TIMOR-LESTE’S 
EXPROPRIATION LAW (Tahan Briefing Note 1/2006, 2016) [copy on file with author]. 
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la develops on land legally held by another, including the state.  
Other studies of urban informal settlements identify factors such as 
duration of occupation, size of settlement, level of community or-
ganization, support from civil society or political representatives, 
and possession of local government documentation as determinants 
of perceptions of proprietary entitlements to land.56  These factors 
support the proposition that Demsetzian property claimants invest 
not only in land, but also in relations with local communities, civil 
society intermediaries and state representatives.  The result can be a 
systemic form of property despite law – involving the coordination 
of proprietary rights at local scales of interaction but not at law. 
 
2.3.  Formalizing Property: Mixed Results for Land Titling 
 
Even though local respect for Demsetzian property claims may 
create perceptions of property entitlements, notwithstanding the de-
nial of de jure rights, there is evidence that legal formalization of 
informal property may further enhance incentives for investment or 
production.  The implication is that, in some circumstances, infor-
mal property claims may develop de facto proprietary characteris-
tics, but are still not generating optimal investment available under 
law.  For example, there are studies that find investment and 
productivity improvements from systematic programs to provide 
documented freehold or long-term leasehold titles to land.  The re-
ported benefits include increases in farm-specific income (Brazil, 
China),57 farm productivity and outputs (Peru, Philippines, Vi-
etnam),58 housing investment (Guatemala),59 capital investment in 
                                                          
56 For a discussion, see REERINK, supra note 22, at 215, 221 (discussing factors 
that “contribute to housing consolidation.”). 
57 See LEE J. ALSTON, ET. AL., THE DETERMINANTS AND IMPACT OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: LAND TITLES ON THE BRAZILIAN FRONTIER, 12 J. L. ECON. ORG. 25, 57–58 
(1996) (discussing the economic development of frontier settlements in Brazil); see 
generally ZHU KELIANG, ET. AL., THE RURAL LAND QUESTION IN CHINA: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON A SEVENTEEN-PROVINCE SURVEY, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 761 (2007) (discussing the economic development of China’s rural tenure).  
58 See Erica Field, Property Rights and Investment in Urban Slums, 3 J. EUR. 
ECON. ASS’N. 279, 280–81 (2005) (discussing Peru); see also RAYMOND J. STRUYK & 
ROBERT LYNN, DETERMINANTS OF HOUSING INVESTMENT IN SLUM AREAS: TONDO AND 
OTHER LOCATIONS IN METRO MANILA, 59 LAND ECON. 444, 453 (1983) (discussing 
Philippines); see generally QUY-TOAN. DO & LAKSHMI IYER, LAND RIGHTS AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FROM VIETNAM (2002) (discussing Vietnam). 
59 Thomas E. Schweigert, Land Title, Tenure Security, Investment, and Farm 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/3
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land (Thailand),60 and land values (Philippines, Peru, Ecuador and 
Venezuela).61  A meta-analysis that controlled for selection biases, 
such as the possibility that investment induces formalization, found 
from 20 empirical studies of systematic land titling programs an av-
erage increase of around 15% in consumption or income, and 
around 40% in the monetary value of land.  There were no signifi-
cant increases in access to credit.62  The studies included Latin 
America (Ecuador, Peru), Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Vietnam) and 
Africa (Ethiopia, Madagascar).63 
The meta-analysis of titling programs also found a puzzling dis-
parity of results for Latin America and Southeast Asia as compared 
to sub-Saharan Africa.  The authors hypothesize the possibility of 
an “Africa effect”—that the strength of de facto customary land 
systems in Africa reduced or eliminated the potential for de jure al-
location of property rights to increase incentives for investment and 
production.64  For example, a comprehensive comparison in Mada-
gascar of titled and untitled land found no significant difference in 
terms of recurrent investment, and only a small increase in land 
values that was not sufficient to justify costs of the titling pro-
gram.65  The Madagascar findings are consistent with other studies 
that find more improvements in production and investment as a re-
sult of titling in urban and newly settled areas than rural areas with 
existing mechanisms for customary land management.66  These 
                                                                                                                                    
Output: Evidence from Guatemala, 40 J. OF DEV. AREAS 115, 123 (2006) (studying the 
relationship between land title, investment and output). 
60 Gershon Feder, et. al., The Determinants of Farm Investment and Residential 
Construction in Post-Reform China, 41 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 1, 1–2 (1992) 
(discussing the incentives to having Chinese farmers make decisions). 
61 See Gershon Feder & Akihiko Nishio, The Benefits of Land Registration and 
Titling: Economic and Social Perspectives, 15 LAND USE POL’Y 25 (1999) (Philippines); 
see generally Emmanuel Jimenez, Tenure Security and Urban Squatting, 66 THE REV. 
OF ECON. & STAT. 556 (1984) (Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela).  For an overview of 
empirical literature, see Trebilcock & Veel, supra note 49, at 423–26. 
62 See generally Ruth Hall, et. al., The Impact of Land Property Rights Interven-
tions on Investment and Agricultural Productivity in Developing Countries: A Systemat-
ic Review, 10 CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS (2012). 
63 Id. at 35–38; see also Field, supra note 58, at 280 (discussing land titling in 
Peru associated with a 68% increase in the rate of housing renovation within four 
years of receiving a title). 
64 Hall, et. al, supra note 62, at 2, 46–48. 
65 See generally Hanan G. Jacoby and Bart Minten, Is Land Titling in Sub-
Saharan Africa Cost-Effective? Evidence from Madagascar, 21 THE WORLD BANK ECON. 
REV. 461 (2007). 
66 See, e.g., Jean O. Lanjouw & Philip I. Levy, Untitled: A Study of Formal and 
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studies suggest that the incentive effects of formalization are not 
only a product of de jure title, but also encompass the nature and 
presence of alternatives such as de facto mechanisms for acknowl-
edging property entitlements. 
 
2.4.  Hybrid Documents and Fragmented Land Markets 
 
The formalization of rights to land may not remove the potential 
for property system fragmentation.  For example, even after sys-
tematic titling of ownership of land, there is evidence that large 
numbers of title-holders choose not to register subsequent transfers 
of rights in national systems of cadastral administration.  The fig-
ures are striking.  A study of the Philippines found that only 15% of 
titleholders register transfers of land with the central government.67  
A study of urban land in Ghana found that 40% register land trans-
fers with the national land agency.68  In Vietnam the figure for ur-
ban areas is 20%.69  In the province of Aceh, Indonesia, only 14% 
of new female titleholders, and 24% of male titleholders, stated an 
intention to register subsequent transactions with the national land 
agency.70  In the Kenyan districts of Gathinga and East Kadianga, 
between 15% and 30% of all land sales in the period between 1966 
and 1973 were registered in accordance with law.71  These low rates 
of subsequent or “derivative” registration land transfers are signifi-
cant as they illustrate the potential for de facto coordination mecha-
nisms to support markets in land irrespective of their status under 
law. 
                                                                                                                                    
Informal Property Rights in Urban Ecuador,  112 THE ECON. J. 986 (2002) (hypothesiz-
ing that titling has most impact in areas without informal rules). 
67 FLORADEMA C. ELEAZAR, ET AL., IMPROVING LAND SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN 
THE PHILIPPINES:  IMPLEMENTATION OF LAND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 
(LGAF), (2013). 
68 UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, GHANA HOUSING 
PROFILE, (2011), at 80. 
69 MAI ANH NGUYEN, ANALYZING THE ENCROACHMENT PROCESS OF INFORMAL 
SETTLEMENTS IN THE PERIURBAN OF HO CHI MINH CITY, VIETNAM 36, 42 (2006) (exam-
ining the social networks of buyers).  
70 WORLD BANK, STUDY ON GENDER IMPACTS OF LAND TITLING IN POST-TSUNAMI 
ACEH, INDONESIA 102 (2011) (discussing gender components to access to justice and 
property rights in Aceh, Indonesia). 
71 Simon F. R. Coldham, Land Tenure Reform in Kenya: The Limits of Law, 17 
THE J. OF MOD. AFR. STUD. 615, 618 (1979) (discussing field-work suggesting the 
number of sales is not insignificant). 
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A key variable for derivative registration of transactions is the 
presence of documentation that provides a substitute for law.  The 
evidence suggests that large sections of land markets in the devel-
oping world rely on documentation other than the prescribed trans-
actional forms of de jure land administration.  Often, the documents 
are witnessed by local government officials, or issued by govern-
ment agencies other than the land office.  For example, in Laos, a 
land tax declaration is the standard form of documentation for trans-
fers of rural land even though there are legal requirements to obtain 
a land survey certificate.72  In Langa, South Africa, informal land 
sale affidavits provide the documentary basis for most land sales 
notwithstanding legal requirements for specialist land notaries to 
prepare notarized sale contracts.73  In India, the documentary basis 
for land markets in informal settlements includes identity cards, tax 
receipts, electricity bills, ration cards or letters from state officials.  
In Indonesia, a 1990 survey of urban households found that only 
5.3% of those without land title certificates (representing 63% of all 
respondents) had no form of government documentation at all, with 
most holding letters of sale witnessed by local officials, or letters of 
occupation issued by local officials.74  The extraordinary extent of 
semi-formal or non-prescribed land documentation in much of the 
developing world highlights the way in which Demsetzian claim-
ants may invest in legitimizing their claims—generating expecta-
tions of coordinated respect for entitlements—through symbols of 
localized state actor recognition rather than the prescribed proce-
dures of property law itself. 
Many legal systems recognize land transfers that do not use 
standard form documentation where there is performance of a valid-
ly executed contract.  In this event, law provides space for locally 
generated proprietary documentation, and the de jure rights-holder 
does not lose legal entitlements through failure to follow the law of 
                                                          
72 See generally BABETTE WEHRMANN ET AL., STUDY ON URBAN LAND MARKETS IN 
LAO PDR (2006); Babette Wehrmann & Danilo R. Antonio, Intermediate Land Ten-
ure: Inferior Instruments for Second-Class Citizens? 1 LAND TENURE JOURNAL (2010) 
(discussing issues surrounding intermediate tenure instruments). 
73 KAROL BOURDREAUX & PAUL DRAGOS ALIGICA, PATHS TO PROPERTY: 
APPROACHES TO INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 60–63 
(2007) (discussing “the South African government’s programme to transfer legal 
title over residential property to residents of townships.”).  
74 See STRUYK, ET AL., supra note 23, at 93–95; see generally JUDE WALLACE, A. P. 
PARLINDUNGAN AND ARIE S. HUTAGALUNG, INDONESIAN LAND LAW AND TENURES - 
ISSUES IN LAND RIGHTS 2–9 (2000). 
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land administration.  However, a number of developing world juris-
dictions have imported the Australian Torrens system, or its equiva-
lents, and stipulate that title arises solely from registration in a na-
tional register regardless of the legal status of the contract of 
transfer.75  In the absence of registration, transfers of title are en-
forceable inter partes but have no proprietary effect on third parties.  
The Torrens system establishes conditions for conflict between de 
facto and de jure property claimants where community practice is 
not to register transfers in the national titles register.76  For example, 
in Cambodia the 2001 Land Law provides that transfers of title 
have proprietary effect only as a consequence of registration of ti-
tle.77  Yet there is evidence that less than 15% of titleholders trans-
fer land according to legal requirements to register standardized 
transfer documents.78  The legal result is that a majority of purchas-
ers or inheritors of land have no de jure rights even where the land 
was subject to titling because there was no registration of transfer at 
a point on the historical chain of title.  Once there is a failure to reg-
ister a transfer of ownership, all subsequent purported transfers lack 
proprietary effect at law, as transferees cannot receive a better title 
than the transferor.  In these circumstances, the bright-line design of 
property law may exacerbate the potential for fragmentation of de 
facto and de jure claimants—as it categorizes large segments of a 
land market as illegal notwithstanding their persistence as social 
practice. 
 
                                                          
75 The list of jurisdictions includes Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, China and Vietnam.  For examples, see Property Rights Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, art. 9 (2007) FAGUI QUANSHU 2–12 (Property Rights 
Law) (“Unless otherwise provided by law, the establishment, modification, trans-
fer and lapse of the right in real property shall only take effect upon registration 
pursuant to laws”); see also the Vietnam Land Law 2013, Law No. 45/2013/QH13, 
art. 183(3) (2013) (“The exchange, transfer, lease, sublease, inheritance, donation or 
mortgage of land use rights… must be registered… and will take effect from the 
time of registration”).  
76 See Daniel Fitzpatrick, Disputes and Pluralism in Modern Indonesian Land 
Law, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 171, 186 (1997) (providing a discussion in relation to Indo-
nesia). 
77 Land Law of 2001, art. 65 (Cambodia) (discussing the enforceability of 
transfer of ownership). 
78 MARK GRIMSDITCH & NICK HENDERSON, UNTITLED: TENURE INSECURITY AND 
INEQUALITY IN THE CAMBODIAN LAND SECTOR 41–42, 106 (2009). 
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2.5.  Property Despite Law 
 
To summarize: evidence from the developing world suggests 
large numbers of landholders denied recognition by law, or who 
choose not to resort to law, are Demsetzian claimants of property 
rather than mere claimants of personal licenses to occupy or use 
land, or self-acknowledged “squatters” lacking proprietary entitle-
ments altogether.  These claimants engage in long-term acts of use 
and exclusion.  They transact land on the basis of assumptions of 
property entitlements.  They seek documentary evidence of entitle-
ments even when they act in contravention of law.  They invest not 
only in production but also in mechanisms to legitimize their 
claims.  Their property claims have proprietary characteristics in so 
far as family, neighbors and other community members coordinate 
behavior on the basis of expectations of respect for their claims.  
Moreover, their strategic responses to law help to define the proper-
ty system outcome.  In particular, they create conditions for frag-
mentation of de facto and de jure property sub-systems when they 
resist or ignore law in favor of coordination mechanisms that lack 
the benefit of recognition by law. 
The evidence further suggests two basic types or circumstances 
of fragmentation.  First, there are property claimants who are denied 
recognition by law but receive local recognition of property-like en-
titlements.  Second, there are property claimants who receive legal 
recognition but decline to resort to law.  Both types of cases involve 
decisions to ignore law in favor of extra-legal institutions.  These 
decisions are optimal where a property claimant chooses not to re-
sort or submit to law because alternative institutional arrange-
ments—such as local norms or customs—lower the costs of proper-
ty more effectively than law.79  The institutions of property are 
aligned as they allow resource users to “mix and match” strategies 
of recourse to law and alternative coordination mechanisms in order 
                                                          
79 ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 167, 283 (discussing, for example, where the 
administrative costs of norm-based arrangements are cheaper than those associat-
ed with recourse to formal law).  A property claimant may also make a rational 
decision not to enforce claims to an asset or attributes of an asset.  She may relin-
quish control to another claimant because of the prohibitive costs of preventing 
infringement.  See, e.g., YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 93 
(2d ed. 1997) (providing examples –the owner of a restaurant may choose not to 
delineate or enforce property rights to salt in the restaurant.  The owner of a gro-
cery store may choose not to enforce rights to all attributes of cherries on display 
in the store.). 
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to reduce the total costs of property.80  This article focuses on cir-
cumstances of misalignment—where the net costs associated with 
property—information, delineation and enforcement—are  greater 
for the property system as a whole because of competition among 
de facto and de jure sub-systems of property.81 
 
2.6.  The Politics of Fragmentation 
 
The following sections begin the enquiry into the causes of 
property system fragmentation with economic theories of the evolu-
tion of property.  The starting point is public choice theory.  Public 
choice provides an explanation for property systems that deny de 
jure rights to long-term occupiers or users of land.82  Legislators 
may “sell” property legislation not only for votes, but for campaign 
contributions, or even bribes.83  Political actors may receive private 
benefits from the power to allocate de jure property rights to mem-
bers of a constituency or interest group without necessarily incur-
ring the costs of compensating Demsetzian claimants who do not 
receive de jure property.84  Stuart Banner provides the example of 
                                                          
80 Id. at 50. 
81 See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and Contracts, 31 THE J. OF 
LEGAL STUD. S489, S490 (2002) (discussing the potential for dissipation of rents in 
process of competing for property); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Ostrom’s Law: Prop-
erty Rights in the Commons, 5 INT’L J. OF THE COMMONS 9, 15 (2011) (discussing ra-
tional decisions not to submit or resort to law may even create negative spillover 
effects for the broader property system); see generally Lee Anne Fennell, The Prob-
lem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1472 (2013) (classifying the various costs 
of property – information, exchange and enforcement – in terms of the costs of re-
source access).  The potential for sub-optimal property outcomes includes the 
“tragedy of the anticommons”, where too many property rights in a resource lead 
to deadlock and under-investment, for further discussion, see generally Michael A. 
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Mar-
kets, 111 HARV. L. REV. ASS’N 621, 678 (1998).  Unlike most studies of anticommons 
problems, which consider their effects on investment, this article provides expla-
nations for their emergence in circumstances of competing de facto and de jure 
claims to land. 
82 See, e.g., Barry C. Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 KYKLOS 319, 335–
40 (1989) (discussing political institutions and the evolution of property). 
83 DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II: A REVISED EDITION OF PUBLIC CHOICE 
344 (1989). 
84 DAVID D. HADDOCK, FORCE, THREAT, NEGOTIATION: THE PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS, reprinted in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, 
AND LAW 187 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003) (“In the ab-
sence of effective limits, government actors are at least as apt to extract property 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/3
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de jure property allocation in British colonial systems.  Minoritarian 
control over coercive political structures minimized the costs of de 
jure property allocation by avoiding distributional compensation to 
de facto claimants such as indigenous groups.85 
Public choice analysis leads to the proposition that political in-
stitutions are the primary determinants of a property regime that de-
nies large numbers of Demsetzian claims to land.  The proposition 
is related to a broader hypothesis formulated by Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson – that political power is the primary determinant of 
all economic institutions.86  This hypothesis deserves some discus-
sion as it illustrates limits on public choice explanations for the evo-
lution of property system fragmentation.  In relation to property, 
Acemoglu et al. adopt the public choice proposition that de jure po-
litical power-holders have incentives to develop property rules, and 
allocate property rights, in order to ensure the future flow of rents.  
De facto political power can override de jure political power, as in 
the case of rebellion or military coups.87  However, de facto politi-
cal power is transient unless it translates into de jure power, as de 
facto power requires sustained episodes of collective action. There-
fore, they argue, the key determinant of a property system is de jure 
political power.88 
Acemoglu et al. illustrate their model for the formation of eco-
nomic institutions with the example of property under European 
colonization.  Colonies with a European minority produced institu-
tions that failed to define or enforce the property rights of the ma-
                                                                                                                                    
rights as to protect them.”). 
85 See Banner, supra note 4, at S369 (“A powerful oligarchy can thus overcome 
the problem of administrative costs simply by not being particularly rigorous in 
valuation and assignment of the property rights of the majority.”); see also 
KATHRYN FIRMIN-SELLERS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GOLD 
COAST:  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS APPLYING RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 7 (1996) (de-
scribing property transitions in Ghana under British rule). 
86 See Acemoglu et al., supra note 5 (expanding their analysis of the determi-
nants of colonial institutions to a general theory of institutions and their causal 
relationship to long-run growth); see also Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & 
James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical 
Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001) (discussing the effect of institutions on 
countries’ economic performance, as defined by income per capita).  
87 Acemoglu et al., supra note 5, at 386–90. 
88 Path dependence develops as de jure political power-holders strengthen 
their capacity to block attempts at institutional change through the accrual of 
wealth and increasing returns from investment in status quo institutions.  Id. at 
390–92.  
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jority, including protection from state predation and expropriation 
of land.  The European minority had de jure political power, but 
lacked economic incentives to secure the property rights of the ma-
jority due to the extractive nature of colonial activity.89  For exam-
ple, the endowments of Latin America and the Caribbean favored 
distributions of political power based on large-scale plantations and 
exploitation of enslaved or indentured labor.  There was a cheap 
supply of labor as a result of high population densities or access to 
the slave trade. Both the climate and the quality of soil suited crops 
such as sugar, coffee and tobacco with scale economies in planta-
tion production.90  Without de facto political responses (i.e. revolu-
tions), the political elite had incentives to design institutions that fa-
cilitated state expropriation of land, and restricted opportunities for 
smallholder landownership, as a result of economic dependence on 
abundant cheap labor and ready access to land. 
In the subject territories of European colonization, state-centric 
features of colonial land law—that the state had allodial title or 
sovereign control over land, and that proprietary interests in land 
derived from state grant or recognition—allowed colonial admin-
istrations to deny ownership rights to large numbers of possessory 
and customary claimants of land.91  This much is consistent with a 
focus on de jure political power as the primary determinant of 
property.  Yet, in many colonial cases, the formal allocations and 
demarcations of law did not align with historical or actual facts of 
control on the ground.92  While some colonial states, such as the so-
called Neo-Europes of Australia, Canada and the United States, de-
veloped the capacity to enforce de jure rights to land, usually as a 
result of military conquest and forcible dispossession of indigenous 
groups,93 most lacked the financial, administrative, or military ca-
                                                          
89 Acemoglu et. al., supra note 5, at 416; see also KENNETH L. SOKOLOFF & 
STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, FACTOR ENDOWMENTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND DIFFERENTIAL 
PATHS OF GROWTH AMONG NEW WORLD ECONOMIES, reprinted in HOW LATIN 
AMERICA FELL BEHIND 260–304 (Stephen H. Haber ed., 1997). 
90 Acemoglu et al., supra note 5, at 400; see also Alston et al, supra note 11, at 
754–65 (providing further illustrations from their survey of settlement frontiers in 
Eastern Australia, the Great Plains of the United States, and Brazil).  
91 See PATRICK MCAUSLAN, BRINGING THE LAW BACK IN: ESSAYS IN LAND, LAW 
AND DEVELOPMENT 59–75 (2003) (describing how European land laws shaped land 
ownership in Commonwealth Africa). 
92 Id.  
93 See STUART BANNER, POSSESSING THE PACIFIC: LAND, SETTLERS, AND 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE FROM AUSTRALIA TO ALASKA, 2 (2007) (noting that, while neither 
Britain nor the United States had official policies of disregarding the property 
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pacity to extend the enforcement authority of state agencies over all 
parts of their territory, particularly in the face of resistance by puta-
tive colonial subjects.94 
The implications of resistance to law are under-analyzed in pub-
lic choice accounts of the evolution of property systems.  Acemoglu 
et al. argue that the exercise of de facto political power through col-
lective acts of rebellion affected the formation of economic institu-
tions such as property through regime change, or changes in the 
policies of governing regimes.  Yet, there were other acts of re-
sistance that contributed to localized processes of property coordi-
nation without changes in formal policy, or configurations of de ju-
re political power.  As James Scott notes, there were comparatively 
few cases of colonial rebellion, and fewer again that induced regime 
change, relative to the long time frames, geographic reach, and ex-
ploitative nature of European colonization.95  Large numbers of co-
lonial subjects engaged not in acts of rebellion but in “the weapons 
of the weak”—acts of foot-dragging, evasion, studied ignorance, 
and false compliance that created everyday resistance to law.96  
Many of these everyday acts of resistance did not involve collective 
political action.  Yet they influenced property outcomes in a num-
ber of ways, not only by increasing the costs of legal enforcement, 
but by asserting alternatives to law—the potential for de facto prop-
erty systems to persist notwithstanding law.97 
Public choice analysis may not explain individual decisions to 
pursue de facto proprietary claims, but it does help to explain state 
                                                                                                                                    
rights of indigenous people, the various mechanisms by which indigenous peo-
ples lost their land were characterized more by compulsion that by consent). 
94 See, e.g., FRANZ VON BENDA-BECKMANN, PROPERTY IN SOCIAL CONTINUITY, 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS IN 
MINANGKABAU, WEST SUMATRA (1979) (Indonesia); SANDRA FULLERTON JOIREMAN, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA 66 (2000) 
(African states); CHRISTIAN LUND, LOCAL POLITICS AND THE DYNAMICS OF PROPERTY 
IN AFRICA (2008) (Ghana); Sally Engle Merry, Law and Colonialism 25 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 897, 918 (1991) (British colonies in Africa).  For an overview, see generally Sal-
ly F. Moore, Changing African Land Tenure: Reflections on the Incapacities of the State, 
10(2) EUR. J. DEV. RES. 33 (1998). 
95 See generally JAMES SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF 
PEASANT RESISTANCE, xv–xvi (1985). 
96 Id. at xvi–xvi, 241–89 (discussing examples from a Malay village). 
97 At times, the result was mutually constitutive interactions between law 
and the acts of property “outlaws.”  See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 93, at 5 (“the ac-
tions and characteristics of indigenous people . . . generated local policies that 
were later incorporated into decisions made in London or Washington”). 
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actor decisions not to enforce law—which is a feature of the cases 
of property system fragmentation discussed in Section I.A.  Failures 
to enforce de jure rules or rights are central to property system 
fragmentation as de facto claims only persist in the absence of state 
coercion.  There may be no enforcement of de jure rules or rights 
where state enforcement agents calculate that the costs of enforce-
ment are not worth benefits such as satisfaction of job requirements 
or political commands, accrual of reputations for competence, or 
satisfaction of constituency demands for “law and order”.  Howev-
er, even in these circumstances, decisions not to enforce law may 
also involve issues of resistance to law.  Acts of violent resistance 
may increase the costs of coercion to the point where there are no 
net benefits to coercive state enforcement of de jure claims.98  For 
example, in relation to land, initial encroachment of de jure claims 
on low value land may not justify acts of resistance or defense by 
de facto claimants.  Marginal increases in encroachment will in-
crease the marginal value of land left under the control of de facto 
claimants.99  The capacity for state enforcement may then reach an 
equilibrium point where the marginal costs of state enforcement of 
de jure claims equals the marginal value of residual land left in the 
hands of de facto claimants. 
To summarize:  there is a body of public choice scholarship that 
analyzes the evolution of property systems in terms of de jure polit-
ical power and its effects on the design of law.100  Politically-
designed rules establish payoffs and strategic options—the incen-
tive structures for economic interaction.101  Yet, limiting the evolu-
tion of property systems to the political design of law begs the ques-
tion:  can a focus on rules alone explain contemporary phenomena 
such as property system fragmentation?  A conceptual frame for 
                                                          
98 For example, the police must take into account the potential costs of acts of 
violent resistance by property violators in exercising discretionary authority to 
engage in enforcement. 
99 For a model of equilibrium enforcement results with reference to violence 
between the Paiute Indians and ranchers in the Owens Valley, see Haddock, supra 
note 84, at 174–75. 
100 See, e.g., DOUGLASS NORTH, FIVE PROPOSITIONS ABOUT INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE, IN EXPLAINING SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 18 (Jack Knight & Itai Sened eds., 
1995) (“It is not possible to develop a theory of institutional change that mixes up 
the players and the rules of the game.  Institutions are the rules of the game and 
organizations are the players . . . .  Modeling institutions is modeling the man-
made constraints on human interaction.”). 
101 See SENED, supra note 4, at 61. 
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property system fragmentation must go beyond the political pro-
cesses that produce a legal rule, or enforcement of the rule, to ex-
plain the way in which the rule fails to establish a shared basis for 
the coordination of property behavior.  In other words, a focus on 
de jure political power as the primary determinant of property does 
not provide a conceptual frame either for decisions to resist or ig-
nore law, or for de facto property systems that self-organize and 
persist notwithstanding law.  While public choice narratives provide 
a framework to analyze interest groups or organizations, and the 
role of the state in the design of property rules, they do not provide 
a comprehensive theory of the comparative pathways of property—
how some systems develop chronic contests, fragmentation and 
overlaps among de facto and de jure mechanisms for the govern-
ance of land. 
 
2.7.  The Limits of Cost/Benefit Analysis 
 
What, then, of Demsetzian analysis?  Does it explain the evolu-
tion of property system fragmentation?  On its face, the cost/benefit 
framework set out by Harold Demsetz in 1967 did not allow for the 
possibility of contests among de facto and de jure property 
claims.102  The analysis predicts the emergence of clear property 
rights as rising resource values increase the net benefits of property, 
or technological change reduces the net costs of property.103  Indi-
viduals claim property over a resource or its attributes once the 
costs of exclusion are worth the benefits.  The cost/benefit decision 
to claim property leaves a property entitlement in the hands of the 
party that values it the most.  By definition, the outcome is “opti-
mistic” as that party has optimal incentives not only to invest in 
production but also to reduce the social costs of resource competi-
tion by monitoring resource use and excluding outsiders (including 
competing property claimants).104  
                                                          
102 Demsetz, supra note 2. 
103 Demsetz, supra note 2, at 350.  See Terry L. Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Evo-
lution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J. L. & ECON. 163, 164–68 
(1975) (examining property rights definition and enforcement activities through 
the framework of a marginal decision model in order to deepen and substantiate 
the discussion of property rights decisions as reflections of marginal costs and 
benefits). 
104 See Demsetz, supra note 2, at 347–48, 350 (elaborating on property as a 
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Demsetz’s analysis does not identify collective mechanisms for 
the evolution of property.  The collective question arises from the 
problem of distributional losses – there must be a collective mecha-
nism to ensure compliance with property as otherwise de facto 
claimants who lose from a de jure property entitlement lack incen-
tives to respect that entitlement.105  Distributional losses are a prod-
uct of the asymmetric value of property.  Even if all parties are bet-
ter off as a result of property, because of increases in the costs of 
resource competition, the party receiving the property right will 
benefit more than the parties that forego a right.  Distributional los-
ers may anticipate greater payoffs from non-cooperation or appro-
priation of a resource than compliance with claims of property 
rights to the resource.  In these payoff circumstances, clear or un-
contested property rights may not emerge because of the potential 
value of property for each party, the distributional losses of no 
property for the other party, and the strategic option of hold-outs or 
appropriation for each party.106  For example, land titling may vest 
lawful owners with rights of exclusion and alienation, thereby re-
ducing the social costs of resource competition.  Yet, it also creates 
distributional losers where it denies the claims of others to rights of 
use, access or future interests—giving rise to incentives for acts of 
resistance to law that may contribute to fragmented property system 
outcomes. 
Absent collective mechanisms, there are circumstances where 
distributional losers may submit to law notwithstanding the loss or 
denial of property entitlements.  That is, so-called squatters may ac-
                                                                                                                                    
mechanism to internalize externalities). 
105 For discussion of analytical gaps in Demsetz’s thesis, see James E. Krier, 
The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 338 (1992) 
(including logical circularity of predictions that a community can coordinate out 
of circumstances of non-coordination); Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling:  Per-
spectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 
37, 51 (1990) (noting how Demsetz uses narrative or storytelling to glide over gaps 
in the analysis, particularly in relation to distributional effects of property transi-
tions).  
106 In order to reach agreement, therefore, the contract may require side pay-
ments to compensate distributional losses incurred by the party that does not re-
ceive the property right.  Yet, in the absence of third-party enforcement, or coop-
erative incentives arising from repeat interactions among participants, a 
distributional loser may not agree to compensation because there is a problem of 
ex ante commitment: the property beneficiary cannot credibly commit to the prom-
ise of compensation without a mechanism to ensure compliance with the agree-
ment.  For a technical discussion, see AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND 
ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF GOVERNANCE 14–15 (2011). 
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cept or submit to law where they acknowledge state authority to 
remove them from their land, or refrain from investing or transact-
ing in land because of their status under law.  The incentives to ac-
cept law notwithstanding distributional losses have Demsetzian el-
ements—not only fear of punishment by the state, or the discounted 
benefit of state compensation, but also calculations of the costs of 
unresolved competition for resources, including the possibility of 
violent conflict over land.  Conversely, individual incentives to re-
sist law arise where the value of lost entitlements exceed the com-
bined costs of resource competition, potential punishment or fore-
gone compensation. Where Demsetzian claimants make cost/benefit 
decisions to resist law, the result is chronic fragmentation among de 
facto and de jure property systems if neither de jure claimants nor 
the state are willing or able to enforce law, and there is no resolu-
tion of conflict through agreement among de facto and de jure 
property claimants.  In all these respects, individual responses to 
law are susceptible to Demsetzian analysis. 
The limits of Demsetzian explanations for property system 
fragmentation remain the issue of collective mechanisms to ensure 
respect for property.107  A critical mass of property users, transac-
tors and potential violators may choose to resist law not only be-
cause of Demsetzian calculations of net distributional losses from 
law, but because of a collective lack of familiarity with law, or an 
absence of belief in the legitimacy of state legal order.  Property 
claimants may act collectively to resist law simply because it is the 
product of a distant centralist state, or a state they perceive as lack-
ing in reliability, legitimacy or probity.  Others may ignore law, 
even in circumstances where there is the possibility of recognition 
by law, because they prefer group-based property institutions em-
bedded in long-standing mechanisms of social organization.  Their 
expectations of behavior may be shaped by self-identification as 
members of a community, tribe, or network rather than citizens of a 
constitutional state.  In all these senses, there is a need to explain 
the phenomenon of property system fragmentation through analysis 
of collective processes as well as the cost/benefit calculations of 
preference-maximizing individuals. 
                                                          
107 See infra Section 3.2. ; see generally EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. 
KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE 
THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP (2010) (identifying ways in which resistance to law may 
affect the evolution of property system fragmentation – not only in terms of for-
mal rules but also for the everyday practices of property). 
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3.  A CONCEPTUAL FRAME FOR PROPERTY SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION 
 
This part develops a conceptual frame for property system 
fragmentation that focuses on coordination.  Coordinated property 
relations may emerge without the need for law.  The standard ex-
ample is respect for possession—where possession provides the ba-
sis for expectations of compliance with property.  Another example 
is custom—where expectations of respect for custom provide the 
basis for compliance with property.  A coordination lens is useful as 
fragmented property outcomes may emerge when law overlays 
property systems based on possession or custom.  In particular, 
there is a misalignment of coordination mechanisms that creates 
fragmented outcomes when law attempts, but fails, to replace pri-
vate systems of property coordination.  These circumstances create 
scope for individuals to resist or ignore law in favor of coordination 
mechanisms that lack the benefit of recognition by law.  Coordina-
tion analysis thus highlights the significance of transitions to law, as 
part of processes of state formation, for the evolution of fragmented 
property systems. 
The analysis highlights the need for analytical approaches to 
property system fragmentation that encompass not only individual 
cost/benefit calculations but also collective processes of social or-
ganization.  Focal points for property coordination are not solely or 
simply asymmetrical features of the environment, selected by ra-
tional actors to avoid costly conflict over resources.  They require 
reproduction through social techniques of legitimation, such as ritu-
al, symbols, and mythology, in order to ensure continued selection 
as a basis for coordination.108  They operate at different scales of in-
teraction—across axes or dimensions of space, time and public au-
thority.  Their scale-sensitive interactions increase as property sys-
tems develop complexity, particularly as systems of law, and the 
state, superimpose arrangements based on families, neighborhoods, 
communities, or networks.  In all these senses, focal points such as 
possession, custom or law have structural or systemic qualities that 
require macro-analytical frames beyond individual choice-making 
by rational actors. 
                                                          
108 See generally CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE 
HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 9–24 (1994) (stating that persuasion 
is integral not only to initial claims of property but to property institutions gener-
ally). 
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Coordination in complex property systems may give rise to sub-
systems, where groups self-organize at different scales of interac-
tion.  Each property sub-system may develop distinct structures, 
imperatives and processes for self-organization.109  Fragmented out-
comes emerge from property sub-systems where there is systemic 
resistance to law, either because there are weak structural linkages 
with law or the state, or because the sub-system has self-organizing 
imperatives that are misaligned with state legal order.  For example, 
individuals may choose not to submit or resort to law where legal 
transition undermines the self-organized basis of their property sub-
system.  They interpret law as being costly even though, on its face, 
the law provides optimal reductions in the costs of property.  Alter-
natively, they may choose not to submit or resort to law because 
their property sub-system lacks structural links with law or the 
state.  Law may have salience and familiarity for actors affiliated 
with the state, but not for members of property sub-systems that 
pre-date the state.110  In the language of systems theory, all these 
possibilities highlight the issue of emergence—the way in which 
micro-behavior interacts with macro-patterns of systemic order-
ing.111 
 
3.1. Coordinating Property 
 
Property coordination is a behavioral phenomenon that gives 
rise to autonomous respect for property—as a supplement or re-
placement for first-party, second-party, or third-party mechanisms 
of enforcement.112  Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith illustrate 
                                                          
109 For an overview of systems theory in a context of law, see NIKLAS 
LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (Klaus A. Ziegert trans., 2004). 
110 John Gillespie provides a series of examples from East Asia and Vietnam.  
See generally John Gillespie, Towards a Discursive Analysis of Legal Transfers into De-
veloping East Asia, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 657 (2008) (describing legal transfers 
into developing states in East Asia); John Gillespie, Exploring the Limits of the Judi-
cialization of Urban Land Disputes in Vietnam, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 241 (2011) [here-
inafter Gillespie, Judicialization] (providing a series of examples of the salience of 
law for actors that pre-date the state in East Asia and Vietnam). 
111 For the standard account of emergence from a systems theory perspective, 
see JOHN H. HOLLAND, EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO ORDER (1998). 
112 See ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 1, at 127 (setting out a tri-
partite classification of social control mechanisms as first, second, or third party in 
nature). 
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property coordination in large group settings with reference to cars 
in a city.113  In any given city, there are large numbers of cars with 
owners or drivers that are not known to other owners or drivers, or 
to pedestrians or potential thieves.  Of themselves, self-help 
measures to protect car ownership, such as alarms or steering locks, 
do not establish generally recognized expectations not to interfere 
with another person’s car.  Equally, legal actions to enforce owner-
ship—through prosecutions for theft or civil actions in trespass—
may shape expectations but are relatively infrequent compared to 
the total number of cars.  Merrill and Smith conclude that coordi-
nated behavior is necessary to underpin a property system as neither 
law nor self-help can solve the problem of ensuring compliance 
with property among a large group of unconnected people.114 
Legal enforcement alone does not solve the problem of property 
compliance because of the high costs of coercion.115  In principle, 
there are no fragmented property outcomes where de facto claim-
ants submit to law because they expect the state to use its compara-
tive advantage in violence to punish infringement, and the net bene-
fits of infringement are less than the anticipated costs of 
punishment.116  However, no state has the capacity to punish all 
those who infringe on property rights.  Just as a private owner is un-
likely to delineate and enforce all aspects of a property claim, so too 
is a state unlikely to rely on coercion alone even where it has a 
comparative advantage in the use of violence.117  For its part, self-
help is also a limited mechanism for ensuring compliance with 
                                                          
113 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1849, 1854 – 55 (2007) (challenging the conventional wisdom that 
the systems of property and morality are disparate and cannot be reconciled).  
114 Id. at 1854 – 55. 
115 Id. at 1853 – 54.  For studies of property coordination in small group con-
texts, see Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1332 (1993) (dis-
cussing the advantages of group ownership of land) [hereinafter Ellickson, Proper-
ty]. 
116 See Haddock, supra note 84, at 186 (“If a potential encroacher recognizes 
the superior might of the servants of the state, no violation will occur, and police 
and military violence will remain a potential rather than an actuality”).  There is 
also an absence of fragmentation where law does not prohibit resort to private en-
forcement mechanisms:  for an example from Japan, see J. Mark Ramseyer & Mi-
kael Adolphson, The Competitive Enforcement of Property Rights in Medieval Japan: 
The Role of Temples and Monasteries, 71 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 660 (2009). 
117 See Haddock, supra note 84, at 188 (“No government attempts to define 
rights comprehensively.”).  See also YORAM BARZEL, supra note 79 (discussing cir-
cumstances where private owners do not seek to enforce their entitlements). 
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property as multiple resource users may calculate that the benefits 
of increased exclusion outweigh the opportunity costs of diverting 
resources from productive use.  In the absence of third-party en-
forcement, each claimant may devote increasing resources to attack 
and defense in order to meet escalating threats of infringement, cre-
ating the potential for cycles of Hobbesian conflict over rights to re-
sources.118 
In game-theoretic terms, coordinated expectations of compli-
ance with a property claim require payoff conditions where the val-
ue of a resource is less than the costs of fighting for control of the 
resource.119  These payoff conditions provide incentives for partici-
pants in a game of resource competition to select an asymmetrical 
feature of the environment—a focal point—in order to avoid costly 
acts of non-coordination.120  For example, where two cars approach 
an intersection at the same speed, with the same preference to be 
first, the intervention of a bystander who waves one car through 
provides a focal point that allows the parties to coordinate priorities 
so as to avoid a collision.  Alternatively, a set of signs at the inter-
section may indicate which driver has the right of way.  In these ex-
amples, the focal point provides a salient and unambiguous feature 
of the environment that both parties are likely to choose as a basis 
for coordinated behavior to avoid the worst possible outcome of 
mutual insistence on a right of way.121  A similar calculus applies to 
property.  Focal points may provide a basis for coordinated expecta-
tions of respect for property in order to avoid the costly outcome of 
Hobbesian conflict over resources.122 
                                                          
118 For a discussion, see Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 128 – 29.  Because of the 
limits of private enforcement, this article focuses on coordination rather than first-
party enforcement strategies relating to property. 
119 The seminal study is THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 
(1980). 
120 For a discussion, see Krier, supra note 1, at 152.  For a general introduction 
to focal point coordination, see ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, 
COOPERATION AND WELFARE 65–86 (1986) [hereinafter SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
RIGHTS]. 
121 See generally Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Genera-
tive Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997) (explaining 
that where the payoffs are equal the choice of focal point is not affected by the dis-
tributional consequences of the choice. For example, motor vehicle drivers may 
choose either to drive on the left or right of the road—the choice has no distribu-
tional implications for individual drivers). 
122 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND 
LEVIATHAN 9 (1975) (“Escape from the world of perpetual Hobbesian conflict re-
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The following discussion considers three potential focal bases 
for property coordination—possession, custom, and law.  The ar-
gument is that these potential focal points may align, overlap or 
compete at multiple scales of interaction—in ways that substantially 
determine the potential for property system fragmentation.  The ap-
proach is stylized, case-based and inductive.123  Examples from East 
Timor, Kenya, and Cambodia generate the broad premise that prop-
erty system fragmentation emerges when law attempts, but fails, to 
replace private systems of property coordination.  East Timor illus-
trates the potential for fragmentation when simple legal rules of 
possession overlay complex possessory customs.  Kenya illustrates 
the social embeddedness of custom as a source of resistance to law.  
Cambodia illustrates state formation and behavior as key variables 
in contested or partial transitions to law.  Taken together, the case 
studies help to explain a key puzzle of property system fragmenta-
tion—why a critical mass of individuals may choose not to submit 
or resort to law even where law appears to provide cost-minimizing 
alternatives to other coordination arrangements. 
 
3.2. Possession and Law 
 
Possession may be a focal point in a game of resource competi-
tion as it provides a clear and visible sign of a relationship with a 
resource.124  The oft-cited example is that of the first car to enter a 
one-way bridge:  it has the right of way as any other rule would be 
highly productive of social disorder.125  The focal point of posses-
sion selects the basis for coordination:  when possessor, play hawk; 
when not a possessor, play dove.  Ensuing patterns of coordination 
                                                                                                                                    
quires an explicit definition of the rights of persons to do things”). 
123 For further discussion of case-based approaches to the formation of insti-
tutions generally, see ROBERT H. BATES et aL., ANALYTIC NARRATIVES (1998).  For an 
example, see AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: 
LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE (2006).  
124 See Krier, supra note 1, at 155 (“Possession is… usually unambiguous, and 
thus provides a clear indication of the status of any claimant”). 
125 See Andrea McDowell, Real Property, Spontaneous Order, and Norms in the 
Gold Mines, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771, 774 (2004) [hereinafter McDowell, Sponta-
neous Order]; see also Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVE 85, 
88 – 90 (1989) (providing more explanation of the example used); see also SUGDEN, 
THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, supra note 120, at 70 – 71. 
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have self-enforcing characteristics where the best response of each 
participant is to defer to—or insist upon—possession given the ex-
pectation that other participants will adopt the same hawk/dove 
strategy.  As a result, possession may provide a basis for property 
coordination in the absence of law, or even in the face of antagonis-
tic law. 
The mining rules of the Californian goldfields between 1848 
and 1849 provide a standard illustration of first possession as a fo-
cal point for property coordination in the absence of law or third-
party enforcement.126  The 19th-century Californian gold rush in-
volved large numbers of miners entering an area that had recently 
been annexed by the United States from Mexico.127  Mexican law 
did not apply as of February 12, 1848, and there was no US federal 
mining law until 1852.128  There were no courts, police or jails, and 
only a small military force.129  Throughout 1849, American miners 
developed mining codes that established a relatively low level of 
disputation despite the competitive nature of the rush for gold it-
self.130  Almost all the mining codes included rules of first posses-
sion that granted rights to the first person to dig a hole and stake a 
claim.131  While initial agreement among miners created the first 
possession rule, the rule generated widespread compliance in the 
absence of third-party enforcement because it served as a focal 
point mechanism to avoid costly conflict over resources.132  
                                                          
126 See Karen Clay & Gavin Wright, Order Without Law? Property Rights Dur-
ing the California Gold Rush, 42 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 155, 177 (2005) (“The 
mining districts of the California gold rush [are] remarkable examples of orderly 
institution-formation in the absence of formal legal authority”); McDowell, Spon-
taneous Order, supra note 125, at 774. 
127 See Clay & Wright, supra note 126, at 158 – 69 (stating that in June 1848 
there were around 5000 people working in the gold mines.  By December 1849 
there were approximately 40,000, and, by 1852, 100,000 gold miners in California). 
128 See id. at 159 – 160 (“No federal mining law was in existence at the time 
gold was discovered”). 
129 See McDowell, Spontaneous Order, supra note 125, at 771 (“[W]hen gold was 
discovered on January 24, 1848, the territory had none of the usual legal institu-
tions such as a legislature, courts, police, or jails”). 
130 See id. at 771 (“When diggings looked promising… those who were on the 
spot held a meeting to pass a more detailed mining code for that particular area . . 
.”). 
131 See Richard O. Zerbe and C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the 
Development of Institutions in the California Gold Fields, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 114, 133 – 35 
(2001) (“First-come, first-served procedures were used by the California miners in 
establishing the choice of claims”). 
132 See id. at 133 (“[f]irst-come, first-served procedures can serve as focal 
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The Californian gold-mining case is significant because it illus-
trates mass transitions to law as a result of increased costs of prop-
erty in self-organized systems based on possession.  From 1851 
onwards, members of the Californian gold-mining associations re-
sorted to the Courts, and then the procedures established by the US 
Mining Act 1871, to resolve increasing numbers of conflicts as the 
number and heterogeneity of miners increased, and technological 
changes allowed more capital-intensive mining utilizing wage la-
bor.133  The transition was consistent with Demsetzian analysis as 
resource users moved from costly institutional arrangements.  The 
potential for recourse to law provided the option of exit from self-
governing property systems.134  The state had a relative advantage 
in reducing the costs of enforcing property based on its capacity to 
cross-subsidize the use of force.  The costs of exit fell as more and 
more group members chose law.  As group members migrated to 
law there was greater access to information on law and its potential 
benefits for other group members.135  Case-studies of this type of 
cost-minimizing transitions to law not only include Californian 
gold-mining associations but also the Amazon frontier in Brazil, 
where settlers sought title documents from the Brazilian state as 
their self-organized mechanisms of property allocation degraded 
under pressure from increased numbers and heterogeneity of set-
tlers.136 
 
Most economic studies of small self-organized property systems 
focus on simple acts of possession as the focal basis for property 
                                                                                                                                    
points to avoid conflict because they appear to be fair”); see also McDowell, Spon-
taneous Order, supra note 125, at 176. 
133 For an overview of the emerging disputes that led to legal transition, see 
Zerbe & Anderson, supra note 131, at 114–143 (2001). 
134 See Andrew P. Morriss, Hayek & Cowboys: Customary Law in the American 
West, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 35, 35 – 37 (2005) (giving an example of self-governing 
legal systems in the American West).  
135 A number of studies model the process of transition from relation-based 
to law-based systems of property.  See, e.g., Avinash Dixit, Two-Tier Market 
Institutions, 5 CHI. J. INT’L LAW 139 (2004); see also Randall L. Calvert, Rational 
Actors, Equilibrium and Social Institutions, in EXPLAINING SOC. INSTITUTIONS, 57 (J. 
Knight & I. Sened eds., 1995).  As Ellickson notes, there are countervailing 
competitive pressures for property sub-systems to minimize exit by their 
members; Ellickson, Property, supra note 115, at 1332. 
136 See generally Lee J. Alston et al.,, A Model of Rural Conflict: Violence and Land 
Reform Policy in Brazil, 4 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 135 – 160 (1999) (providing more de-
tail of the Brazilian case-study). 
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coordination.  The possession in question involves Lockean acts—
inputs of labor that create visible markers to outsiders.  Hence, the 
California case involved relatively simple acts such as hole-digging 
and leaving tools in the hole.  In a related study, the act of clearing 
a space for parking during Chicago snow storms, combined with 
markers such as leaving a chair in the cleared area, led to coordinat-
ed respect for entitlements without resort or reference to law (albeit 
with the potential for violent self-help acts).137  Both these studies 
are characterized by easy-to-understand acts of possession, and 
relatively brief periods of proprietary entitlement.  In contrast, the 
following case study of East Timor illustrates complex possessory 
acts in multi-generational systems of property coordination.  The 
case is useful as this type of multi-generational coordination mech-
anism is more typical of complex property systems relating to land 
than the short-lived cases of Californian gold-mining or Chicago 
car parking.  The East Timor case illustrates the potential for frag-
mented outcomes when a state overlays legal rules of possession on 
possessory norms embedded in pre-state systems of social organiza-
tion. 
 
3.2.1. Complex Possession in East Timor 
 
Each of the 26 or so ethno-linguistic groups in the new nation-
state of East Timor have mythologies of ancestral first possession, 
where social precedence and identity derives from narratives of de-
scent traced to a founding ancestor.138  Typically, the story of ances-
tral first possession involves migration to new land by the founding 
ancestor, combined with ritualized acts of appeasing the spirits of 
the land.  Daniel Fitzpatrick and Susana Barnes argue that, in cus-
tomary areas, mythologies of ancestral first possession act as a focal 
basis for property coordination because they provide a shared cul-
tural basis for determining entitlements to land.139  In-migrants are 
aware they can obtain access to land, and avoid costly forms of con-
flict, through marriage into the group or allocation of land by the 
                                                          
137 Epstein, supra note 1, at S516, S519. 
138 Daniel Fitzpatrick & Susana Barnes, The Relative Resilience of Property: First 
Possession and Order Without Law in East Timor, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 205, 206 (2010) 
[hereinafter Fitzpatrick & Barnes, Relative Resilience]. 
139 Id. at 216 – 26. 
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senior lineage of the group (i.e. the lineage most proximate by de-
scent to the source of origin).140  Most in-migrants that engage in 
Lockean acts of clearing, cultivation and house construction contin-
ue to define their proprietary entitlements by reference to relation-
ships with lineages tracing descent to the ancestral first posses-
sor(s).141  Over a very long period of time, the nesting of Lockean 
concepts of possession within a broader principle of ancestral first 
possession has acted as a cultural technique for maintaining proper-
ty coordination in circumstances of human mobility and exogenous 
marriage.142 
Within customary groups, there are tensions between entitle-
ments based on claims of direct descent from founding ancestors 
and claims based on Lockean acts of possession.  For example, 
some subordinate households or lineages place boundary markers 
on land left fallow, even though the senior lineage has broad author-
ity over fallow lands.143  In addition, in coastal areas first cleared 
under colonial Portuguese supervision, there are household claims 
to land based not on customary allocation pursuant to ancestral 
origin narratives, but on unqualified assertions of Lockean posses-
                                                          
140 In the patrilineal societies of the island of Timor, the senior lineage de-
scends through the eldest son of the founding ancestor (and through the eldest 
daughter for the matrilineal Ema group).  For an overview, see Fox, J, 'Installing the 
'outsider' inside: the exploration of an epistemic Austronesian cultural theme and its so-
cial significance', Indonesia and the Malay World, Vol. 36, No. 105, pp. 201 – 218 
(2008). 
141 See Renee B. Clamagirand, The Social Organization of the Ema of Timor, in 
THE FLOW OF LIFE: ESSAYS ON EASTERN INDONESIA 231 (James. J. Fox ed., 1980) (dis-
cussing “wife-giver/wife-taker” relations among the Ema ethno-linguistic group 
of East Timor); see also James J. Fox, Austronesian Societies and Their Transformations, 
in THE AUSTRONESIANS: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 229 (Peter 
Bellwood et al., eds., 2006) (discussing “wife-giver/wife-taker” categories in the 
light of cultural metaphors of precedence among Austronesian groups in the east-
ern Indonesian archipelago); see also ELIZABETH B. TRAUBE, COSMOLOGY AND SOCIAL 
LIFE: RITUAL EXCHANGE AMONG THE MAMBAI OF EAST TIMOR (1986) (discussing 
“male” and “female” houses of origin among the Mambai ethno-linguistic group 
of East Timor). 
142 See Fitzpatrick & Barnes, Relative Resilience, supra note 138, at 218 – 26 (dis-
cussing in-migration and cultural incorporation techniques in the village of 
Babulo, Lautem District); see also Andrew R. McWilliam Customary claims and the 
public interest: on Fataluku resource entitlements in Lautem, in EAST TIMOR:  BEYOND 
INDEPENDENCE 165 (D. Kingsbury & M. Leach eds., 2007) (exploring in-migrations 
and customary notions of precedence on the Eastern district of Lautem). 
143 See generally Daniel Fitzpatrick & Andrew McWilliam, Bright-Line Fever: 
Simple Legal Rules and Complex Property Customs among the Fataluku of East Timor, 
47 LAW & SOC. REV. 311 (2013) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick & McWilliam, Bright-Line 
Fever] (exemplifying the complexity of bright-line property rules in East Timor). 
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sion—such as clearing and digging irrigation channels—combined 
with the grant of a hoe by village government officials appointed by 
the Portuguese colonial administration.144  In each case, claims of 
possessory entitlements require iterated acts of legitimation—
involving mythology, ritual, and symbols—as simple physical acts 
of possession alone are not sufficient to generate expectations of re-
spect for entitlements.  Often, these acts of legitimation also involve 
reference to systems of authority—for example, the original author-
ity of senior customary lineages or the political authority of colonial 
administration.145  The implication is that possessory entitlements 
embed over time in systems of authority, identity, and social organ-
ization—as a long-term consequence of human mobility, exoga-
mous marriage, and regime change. 
East Timor (Timor Leste) attained independence in March 
2002.  A land law approved by the Parliament of the new nation-
state now purports to recognize individual acts of long-term posses-
sion as a basis for alienable ownership rights to land.146  The enti-
tlement extends to land claimed by customary groups.147  Possessors 
are defined to include those who reside in, have erected buildings 
on, or have cultivated land—even where that land is claimed by an-
other party on the basis of ancestral customary domain.  The law 
thus adopts legal principles of possession based on physical use of 
land rather than social understandings of the proprietary signifi-
cance of possessory acts.  The result is different epistemic concep-
tualizations of property and possession, which creates barriers to the 
                                                          
144 Janet Gunter, Communal Conflict in Viqueque and the ‘Charged’ History of ’59, 
8 ASIA PAC. J. ANTHROPOLOGY 27, 34 – 35 (2007) (describing how the opening of 
large rice paddies created disagreements over land tenure). 
145 See Fitzpatrick & McWilliam, Bright-Line Fever, supra note 143 (providing a 
detailed discussion). 
146 The law is not in force as the President of East Timor sent it back to the 
National Parliament for re-consideration in March 2012:  see Wright, supra note 55.  
The draft law provides that a claimant may be entitled to ownership on the basis 
of continuous, peaceful and notorious possession that commenced on or before 
December 31, 1998, provided there is no predecessor title issued under Portu-
guese or Indonesian regimes to East Timorese citizens (art. 22). 
147 Article 10(3) defines possessors to include those who reside in, have erect-
ed buildings on, or have cultivated land claimed by another party based on the 
belief of ancestral customary domain, even when rent is being paid to that party.  
This definition potentially allows persons that are not members of customary 
groups to claim alienable ownership of ancestral customary land.  This category 
includes large numbers of people forcibly relocated during Indonesian times to 
land claimed by a customary group.  For further discussion, see Fitzpatrick & 
McWilliam, Bright-Line Fever, supra note 143. 
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adoption of law as a new focal basis for property coordination.148  
Understanding the coordination of property systems, on the basis of 
focal points such as possession, therefore implicates epistemic con-
ceptualizations of property as well as historical mechanisms of so-
cial organization. 
To summarize:  expectations of respect for possession may pro-
vide the basis for coordinated property systems.  While economic 
case-studies focus on small group settings, shared expectations of 
respect for possession may provide a basis for coordinated behavior 
in multi-scale property systems.  The possibility of respect for pos-
session helps to explain the emergence of property sub-systems in 
settings such as informal urban settlements.  Residents who set out 
markers of occupation and labor may generate expectations of re-
spect for their claims irrespective of law.  At the same time, cases 
such as East Timor illustrate the embedded nature of possessory 
norms in complex settings involving long-term claims to land.  
Over time, proprietary claims based on possession embed in collec-
tive methods of social organization, and include investments in 
techniques of social legitimation.  The implication is that analyzing 
fragmented property outcomes where law overlays systems based 
on possession requires attention not only to individual choices 
among institutional arrangements but to historicized methods of so-
cial organization, cultural techniques for social legitimation, and ep-
istemic understandings of property and possession. 
 
3.3.  Custom and Law 
 
Economic analyses identify a need for focal points other than 
possession at scales of resource governance beyond single-use pro-
duction environments.  To take a number of examples from the lit-
erature: where resources are newly available to claim, a simple 
convention of respect for possession may encourage costly races for 
possession as resource users escalate efforts to obtain possession in 
order to appropriate control of resources before other users.149  Rac-
                                                          
148 See, e.g., Gillespie, Judicialization, supra note 110 (stating that the coordinat-
ed resolution of land disputes between the state and self-organized groups of its 
citizens may require a language or communicative medium that is mutually intel-
ligible for all parties). 
149 See Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38. J. 
L. & ECON. 393, 406–07 (1995) (explaining a contractual model).  
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ing for possession may dissipate resources in conflict with other 
competitors, or through investments in unsuccessful acts of racing.  
Similarly, in common pool circumstances, rising resource values 
may cause a ‘tragedy of the commons’ to develop as a result of es-
calating exploitation of the flow from a resource when each posses-
sor appropriates more, in anticipation of increased appropriations 
by other possessors.150   
In mixed-use circumstances, rising resource values increase in-
centives for individual possessors to shift the costs of their own use 
to other users, or to appropriate the benefits of other acts of re-
source use without bearing the costs of resource investments.151  
Custom may act as a focal alternative or supplement to posses-
sion.  Cases of custom as a focal point for property coordination in-
clude customary rules that mitigate the risk of competitive races for 
a resource or its flow.152  Typically, the information costs of custom 
are such as to require recursive techniques of ritual, symbolism and 
narrative in order to promote salience and shared understandings of 
custom as a focal point for property coordination.  As Bourdieu 
notes, these recursive processes involve the habituation of individu-
al choice—the internalization of social structure through accultura-
tion techniques.153  The following case study of Kenya highlights 
customary principles of descent-reckoning as a powerful source not 
only of social structure but of expectations relating to land.  For 
poststructuralist anthropologists, descent-reckoning is an outdated 
means of analyzing social organization, because of the manipula-
tion of genealogies and settlement narratives by powerful actors.154  
                                                          
150 See Thráinn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus Common Property, in PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 77–9 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. 
McChesney eds., 2003).  
151 See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open 
Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 132 (2000) (discussing the use of the open-field sys-
tem). 
152 See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 
1990) (providing an overview with examples). 
153 See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE 
JUDGEMENT OF TASTE 170, 471 (Richard Nice trans., 1984) (describing unconscious 
processes and cultural products of habituation that internalize notions of social 
order for individuals). 
154 See Merry, supra note 94, at 904 (discussing lineage analysis in colonial 
contexts).  Structuralism here primarily refers to structuralist schools of anthro-
pology.  While structuralism is most closely associated with the 1960’s work of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss, structural anthropology has a longer pedigree in so far as 
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Nevertheless, the Kenyan case suggests that descent-reckoning may 
provide a focal basis for property coordination notwithstanding the 
purported replacement of custom by law.  The implication is that 
the embeddedness of coordination decisions in customary mecha-
nisms of social ordering may explain decisions not to resort to law, 
even where the law appears to provide optimal reductions in the 
costs of property. 
 
3.3.1.  The Embeddedness of Custom in Kenya 
 
Kenya provides an example where property law attempts to re-
place custom with bright-line rules of title registration and transfer.  
In particular, the Registered Land Act 1962 and the Land Adjudica-
tion Act 1968 establish mechanisms for the conversion of custom-
ary rights to land into registrable statutory interests.  The registered 
proprietor of land obtains “absolute ownership… free from all other 
interests and claims whatsoever,” subject to interests recorded on 
the titles register and overriding interests set out in the Land Act.  
This principle of indefeasibility of registered title is basic to Torrens 
systems of land law.  Customary law no longer applies to the legal 
conveyance of proprietary interests in land as legal title arises from 
the registration of prescribed written instruments rather than per-
formance of the contract of transfer.155  The Torrens principle that 
                                                                                                                                    
earlier anthropologists sought to identify systemic patterns from fine-grained 
studies of social behavior.  For more examples of this, see A. R. RADCLIFFE-
BROWN, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY (1952) and Claude Lévi-
Strauss, Language and the Analysis of Social Laws, 53 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 155 
(1951) (describing a relationship between linguistic analysis and the comparative 
study of customs, institutions and behavior).  Post-structuralism seeks to move 
beyond assumptions of shared meaning to consider processes of imposition or 
negotiation of meaning.  This is illustrated by JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND 
DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans., 1967) (providing canonical statements of post-
structuralism) as well as ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY (Annette La-
vers & Colin Smith trans., 1967).  A key feature of poststructuralist approaches is 
the deconstruction of meaning – the de-centering and re-ordering of assumptions 
to explore the processes and power relations behind productions of meaning. For 
a broad discussion of structuralist theory, see Jack M. Balkin, Deconstructive Prac-
tice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987) (applying Derrida’s work on decon-
struction of meaning to legal theory). 
155 See Land Adjudication Act, (2012) Cap. 284 s 26A, 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ken62433.pdf [https://perma.cc/AMD3-6XSE] 
(demonstrating that at the time of first registration, the Land Adjudication Act re-
quires Adjudication Officers to record leases and rights of occupation recognized 
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legal title arises from registration rather than the transaction creates 
the brightest of bright-line rules: registered interests override unreg-
istered interests, and information about registered interests lies in a 
public register.  In theory, therefore, Torrens law provides optimal 
reductions in transaction and information costs for all resource par-
ticipants—creating Demsetzian incentives to transition to Torrens 
law in order to reduce the private costs of property and the social 
costs of resource competition. 
The dense relational webs of property may impose collective 
constraints on cost-minimizing incentives to transition to law, be-
cause of customary obligations to family, neighbors or a local 
community.  Kenya provides an example as relational aspects of 
property in Kenya reflect embedded social obligations that are quite 
distinct from the bright-line rules of Torrens law.  For example, a 
survey by Angelique Haugerud found that around 85% of rural 
households are constituted by multi-generational family groups, 
with married sons and unmarried daughters living in homestead ar-
rangements involving separated housing.  In a survey by H.W. 
Okoth-Ogendo of two districts in western Kenya, over 95% of re-
spondents stated they had acquired land through lineage or extend-
ed family inheritance mechanisms.  In one district, 87% of respond-
ents agreed it was “inconceivable” that a registered proprietor 
would attempt to expel lineage members from the land, and only 
4% stated that they would move willingly in the event of any such 
attempt at expulsion.  In the other survey district, 28% agreed that 
expulsion was inconceivable, and 55% stated they would “demand 
their share” in the event of expulsion.156  Yet, in all cases, while 
there are deep-seated perceptions that lineage members have enti-
tlements to land, the effect of Torrens law is that those with unreg-
istered claims to lineage land have no lawful cause of action against 
registered proprietors in the absence of agreements to occupy, or 
other bases for personal claims in courts exercising equitable juris-
                                                                                                                                    
by customary law in the land titles register); see also Simon Coldham, The Effect of 
Registration of Title upon Customary Land Rights in Kenya, 22(2) J. AFR. L. 91, 100–02 
(1978) [hereinafter Coldham, Effect of Registration] (showing that, in practice, there 
is very little recording of customary interests as year to year tenancies in Kenya 
due to the time, expense and complexity of determining interests according to 
customary law). 
156 See generally H.W.O. OKOTH-OGENDO, THE PERILS OF LAND TENURE REFORM: 
THE CASE OF KENYA, (UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI DIGITAL REPOSITORY, 1986), 
http://hdl.handle.net/11295/35689 [https://perma.cc/25D7-G2DW] (investigat-
ing the negative impacts of land tenure reform).  
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diction. 
There is evidence that many, if not most, legal owners of rural 
land in Kenya do not comply with the mandatory rules of Torrens 
law, as a result of adherence to social conventions concerning line-
age land.  For example, the law requires heirs to report the death of 
a registered proprietor of land to the local chief, who must inform 
the District Court, which issues a certificate of succession.  Certifi-
cates of succession are necessary to register changes to registered 
proprietorship of land under the Registered Land Act.  Very few 
heirs, however, seek to alter the registered proprietorship of land.157  
Simon Coldham quotes a government officer writing in the early 
1960s that over 3000 titles registered in the names of deceased per-
sons had not been the subject of requests for transfer of registration 
to heirs in Kaimbu District alone.158  Coldham further notes that in 
East Kadianga no more than 3.4% of deceased estates had been the 
subject of registered transfer of title.  In Gathinga the figure was 
21.4%.159  Over time, the land titles register has lost currency in 
Kenya as unregistered male heirs of deceased registered proprietors 
establish their own families, and pass down their own parcels of 
land to their sons.160  In short, Kenyan land law has attempted, but 
failed, to displace customary succession practises161—a result that is 
also reported in studies of the Asante in Ghana and the Minangkbau 
in West Sumatra.162 
                                                          
157 See id. at 12 (discussing provisions that should have been included in the 
Registered Land Act). 
158 See Coldham, Land Tenure Reform, supra note 71, at 618 (citing F. D. 
Homan, Succession to Registered Land in the African Areas of Kenya, II J. ADMIN. 
OVERSEAS (LONDON) 50). 
159 See Coldham, Effect of Registration, supra note 155, at 105 (elaborating on 
the operations of the land register). 
160 See Angelique Haugerud, Land Tenure and Agrarian Change in Kenya, 59(1) 
ACCESS, CONTROL & USE OF RESOURCES IN AFR. AGRIC. 61, 66 (1989) (describing di-
vergences between formal and informal tenure systems). 
161 See Registered Land Act, (1963) Cap. 300 s 107, 
http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/RegisteredLandActCap
300.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KKJ-G3VX] (stating that the Registered Land Act 
preserves the customary law(s) of succession: it seeks to displace the laws to the 
extent that it requires register changes to the proprietorship of land through pre-
scribed instruments in order to give effect to transfers of legal title). 
162 See Sara Berry, The Everyday Politics of Rent-Seeking: Land Allocation on the 
Outskirts of Kumase, Ghana, in NEGOTIATING PROPERTY IN AFRICA 111, 115 (Kristine 
Juul & Christian Lund eds., 2002) (“the law appears to have made only modest 
inroads into the practise of matrilineal inheritance”).  Among the matrilineal 
Minangkbau of West Sumatra, Franz and Keebet von Benda Beckmann ascribe 
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A methodological focus on individual choice-making may ex-
plain the Kenya case on the basis of constraints on cognition and in-
formation.163  Studies in behavioral economics identify the way in 
which humans frame choices of coordination mechanisms accord-
ing to familiarity as they are averse to losses, including losses 
caused by the unfamiliarity of transition to law.164  As a result, they 
may resist or ignore law simply because it is the product of a distant 
centralist state.  They may prefer local coordination mechanisms 
because of constraints on calculating the benefits of law.  Their pre-
dictions of behavior may be shaped by membership of a community 
or group rather than citizenship of a state.  Similarly, the internali-
zation of customs as norms, and conventions of behavior, may cre-
ate pro-social preferences where individuals adopt coordination 
strategies notwithstanding the net private costs of their actions.165  
This may involve processes of ‘team reasoning’, where individuals 
who self-identify as members of a group attempt to select a focal 
point because they believe that other participants are likely to select 
the same focal basis for coordinated behavior.166  All these con-
strained acts of individual choice form part of fragmented property 
outcomes where they involve decisions not to submit or resort to 
law. 
                                                                                                                                    
low rates of registration of individual titles to land to the potential for conflict 
with the inheritance rights of sub-lineage members, as registration implies deci-
sions to allocate the assets of a deceased estate to children only.  For more infor-
mation, see Franz & Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Struggles over Communal Proper-
ty Rights and Law Minangkabau, West Sumatra, (Max Planck Institute for Social 
Anthropology Working Paper No. 64, 2004), 
http://www.eth.mpg.de/pubs/wps/pdf/mpi-eth-working-paper-0064.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GE9X-CYE8]. 
163 See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Econom-
ics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (providing a normative analysis of how and when 
the legal system respects people’s choices). 
164 See Ostrom, supra note 152, at 208–209 (applying the work of Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky providing a discussion in relation to resource gov-
ernance). 
165 See generally Jeffrey P. Carpenter, Negotiating in the Commons: Incorporating 
Field and Experimental Evidence into a Theory of Local Collective Action, 156 J. INST. & 
THEORETICAL ECON., 661 (2000) (offering a view of how studies of law and eco-
nomics can be improved by increased attention to insights about human behav-
ior). 
166 See generally Nicholas Bardsley, et al., Explaining Focal Points: Cognitive 
Hierarchy Theory versus Team Reasoning, 120 ECON. J. 40 (2010) (reporting that 
coordinated behavior is the result of group members' reasoning based on their 
common beliefs and the individuals' pre-reflective inclincations towards the 
relevant strategies). 
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Anthropological studies highlight the fact that decisions to 
adopt group custom help to construct social identity within a group, 
while also reinforcing the legitimacy of the custom itself.167  Cus-
tom implicates processes of legitimation—the way in which a prac-
tice becomes accepted as “customary.”168  Custom may develop le-
gitimacy not only through repetition or past practice, but through 
cultural processes of habituation—the application of values, beliefs 
and reasoning characteristic of a particular social group.169  Habitua-
tion tends to occur within a social field—a structural space for re-
peat human interaction.170  The language, ritual and myth that create 
a social field also shape the emergence of shared expectations of 
behavior.  As a result, the analytical techniques of anthropology—
the study of myth, ritual and language—provide insights into frag-
mented property outcomes when the state-centric narratives of land 
law fail to displace the habituation processes of sub-state property 
systems.171 
Multi-disciplinary perspectives are necessary to explain interac-
tions among custom and law in multi-scale property systems.  The 
economic literature on small group property systems highlights the 
potential for exit as a result of demographic growth and increased 
sale or lease of land to outsiders.172  In similar vein, Abraham Bell 
                                                          
167 See generally John W Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: 
Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977) (establishing that 
when formal organizational structures become isomorphic with the myths of the 
of the institutional environment, a group logic of confidence and good faith is 
employed in order to maintain legitimacy). 
168 For a leading sociological discussion, see generally Lynne G Zucker, The 
Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 726 (1977). 
169 For sociological studies that analyze habituation as a function of collective 
processes rather than individual agency, see generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY (1984) (setting out a structuration theory of institutions); 
see also MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK (1986) (describing processes of 
naturalizing institutions). 
170 See, e.g., DEBORAH REED-DANAHAY, LOCATING BOURDIEU (Dephne Berdahl, 
et al., eds., 2005) (discussing Bourdieu’s use of social field concepts). 
171 See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Post-
modern Conception of Law, 14 J. L. & SOC’Y 279 (1987) (setting out a theory of struc-
tural spaces through which law is negotiated); see also Sally Falk Moore, Law and 
Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 
L. & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1972-1973) (describing the semi-autonomous social fields that 
govern the relationship between legal change and social change). 
172 Self-governing systems require information flows to induce cooperation 
through the threat of withdrawal of cooperation.  Other members of a group must 
be aware of a transgression such as non-compliance with property in order to re-
fuse to cooperate.  Conversely, a potential transgressor will take into account the 
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and Gideon Parchomovsky highlight the network effects of law—
the more people following law the greater the costs of extra-legal 
arrangements.173  Yet, there remains a puzzle of customary persis-
tence, even in circumstances where individual cost/benefit calcula-
tions favor submission or resort to law. Cases of customary persis-
tence require circumstances where neither the state nor de jure 
landholders engage in coercive enforcement of law—as in the agri-
cultural and forest area cases discussed in Part I above.  In these 
types of circumstances, Bell and Parchomovsky apply cost/benefit 
perspectives to argue that extra-legal property regimes may persist 
inter alia where the costs of legal conformity are too high.174  The 
Kenyan case further suggests that disciplinary perspectives such as 
anthropology are required to explain the habituation processes that 
shape the preferences, perceptions and cost/benefit pay-offs of indi-
vidual decisions not to conform with law. 
 
3.4.  Transitions to Law 
 
Richard McAdams and others highlight the expressive benefits 
of law—the potential for the public expression of law to ensure 
transition to focal points selected or created by law.175  Law may 
                                                                                                                                    
likelihood of information about the transgression being transmitted to other 
members of the group or network.  As new members join a group there will be 
marginal increases in the costs of information where new members lack the in-
formation connections of long-term members.  Increased dealings with outsiders 
also lead to marginal increases in the costs of processing information on reputa-
tion for cooperation or honesty.  See Dixit, supra note 135, at 73–4; see also MUELLER 
supra note 83, at 264–5, 278–9 (providing a discussion). 
173 See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Property Lost in 
Translation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 514 (2013) (exploring the relationship between local-
ized and state property systems). 
174 Id. at 520–21.  The other explanations for persistence of extra-legal ar-
rangements are also based on cost/benefit analysis (i.e. that interest groups form 
to maintain the extra-legal regime, or that political incentives create conscious 
subsidization of costly extra-legal arrangements). 
175 See generally Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 
86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000), (contending that when individuals need to coordinate, 
law works to make one equilibrium “focal” and thereby creates expectations that 
others will play the strategy associated with that equilibrium); see also Robert 
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998) (developing 
an expressive theory of the law, in which law can tip a system of social norms into 
a new equilibrium by expressing social values); see also Dhammika Dharmapala & 
Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of 
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have reputational and informational advantages that facilitate al-
tered expectations of behavior without the need for coercion.  The 
presence of an alternative focal point – selected or created by law—
creates a fear of negative payoffs:  what if other players switch to 
the new strategy?176  Once a critical mass of players switch strate-
gies, doubts as to the validity of past experience become self-
reinforcing.  The converse holds true as well.  Where law lacks rep-
utational or informational advantages, past experience of compli-
ance with a focal point such as possession or custom may continue 
to provide a guide to future behavior notwithstanding law.  At local 
scales of interaction, a critical mass of property users, transactors 
and potential violators may avoid transitions to law not only be-
cause the state is unable or unwilling to enforce law, but because of 
a lack of familiarity with law, or an absence of belief in the reputa-
tional effects of law.  
Property participants may not accept specific law as a basis for 
property coordination because of a lack of knowledge about the 
consequences of law.  Yet, they may accept the idea of state legal 
order—that lawful decisions of the state provide a basis for property 
coordination notwithstanding the absence of informational clarity 
about the law itself.177  This insight highlights the comparative sig-
nificance of the state for transitions to law.  There may be circum-
stances where even the idea of state legal order is not a shared basis 
                                                                                                                                    
Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5(1) AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 – 31 (2003) (arguing 
that legislation can generate compliance expressively, independently of deter-
rence); see also Jonathan R. Hay & Andrei Shleifer, Private Enforcement of Public 
Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform, 88(2) GOV’T IN TRANSITION 398 (1998) (discussing 
how the legal system can be the key to institutional reform in governments in 
transition); see also Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 
79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000) (theorizing that law changes behavior by signaling the 
underlying attitudes of a community or society). 
176 For example, a player with hawk strategy may find other players adopting 
hawk strategies because of anticipated payoffs under a new law.  Conversely, a 
player with a dove strategy may contemplate adoption of a hawk strategy to an-
ticipate dove strategies by other players.  Individual participants have incentives 
to transition to the new focal point when they anticipate that losses created by a 
failure to change strategy are greater than the distributional losses of the change 
of strategy. 
177 See Nicholas Almendares & Dimitri Landa, Strategic Coordination and the 
Law, 26 LAW & PHIL. 501, 528 (2007) ("In coordinating on a particular set of legal 
and political institutions whose constitutionally sanctioned operation defines ‘the 
rule of law,’ citizens are, in effect, coordinating on regarding as legitimate the gov-
ernance decisions."). 
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for expectations of behavior.178  Potential examples include states 
imposed through colonization or invasion, or states affected by per-
ceptions of illegitimacy or endemic corruption.  In these cases, the 
state is not a stable fundamental of social organization.179  Its citi-
zens may identify themselves as members of sub-groups, distin-
guished by language, geography, or ethnicity rather than members 
of a legitimate constitutional order.180  As a result, the capacity of 
law to select or create new focal points for property coordination 
not only involves habituation processes within groups, but structur-
al variables associated with the state itself.  These variables include 
the circumstances of state creation, the quality and accessibility of 
its services, and the strength of its “rule of law” legitimacy.  The 
following case study of Cambodia provides a contemporary illustra-
tion. 
 
3.4.1.  State Title to Land in Cambodia 
 
Cambodia’s Land Law of 2001 situates the state at the apex of a 
hierarchical system of proprietary rights to land.  First, it creates a 
default rule of state title to land—land that belongs to no one be-
longs to the state.  Second, it establishes the state as the allodial 
source of ownership rights to land—all ownership rights derive 
from or through the state.  After the genocide of Khmer Rouge rule, 
the Land Law constructs the state as a Westphalian entity with sov-
ereign authority over territory.  At the same time, it overlays local 
                                                          
178 See, e.g., Olivier Roy, Development and Political Legitimacy: The Cases of Iraq 
and Afghanistan, 4 CONFLICT SECUR. DEV. 167, 171 (2004). (discussing the challenge 
to State-building of tribe and family-based loyalties that exist “below the State 
level”); see also Katherine B. Carroll, Tribal Law and Reconciliation in the New Iraq, 65 
MIDDLE E. J. 11, 11–29 (2011) (describing the influence of tribal law and custom on 
conflict resolution in Iraq); see also Mahmud E. Zain, Tribe and Religion in the Sudan, 
23 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 523, 528 (1996) (analyzing the role of tribal categories in 
the Sudanese polity). 
179 For a comprehensive, theoretical overview of state formation and its rela-
tionship with property, see Christian Lund, Negotiating Property Institutions: The 
Symbiosis of Property and Authority in Africa, in NEGOTIATING PROPERTY IN AFRICA, 
11 (2002). 
180 For a discussion on circumstances of state collapse, see William Zartman, 
Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse, in COLLAPSED STATES: THE 
DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 1, 5 (1995) (“As a 
symbol of identity, [the State] has lost its power of conferring a name on its people 
and a meaning to their social action."). 
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property orders based primarily on expectations of respect for pos-
session.  While the law recognizes possession as a basis for owner-
ship, it excludes state land from lawful acts of possession, including 
ownership claims based on acquisitive prescription under the Civil 
Code or “special acquisitive possession” under the Land Law.  The 
result is a high degree of fragmentation as norms of possession re-
main resilient notwithstanding that the state claims large areas of 
land subject to acts of possession as state land. 
Under the 2001 law, a Cambodian citizen may apply for owner-
ship rights to land on the basis of a rule of special acquisitive pos-
session—five years’ continuous possession of land prior to August 
30, 2001.181  Yet, the law also provides that land subject to special 
acquisitive possession must be capable of lawful possession.  There 
is no lawful possession of land that is the “public property” of the 
state, which includes areas on the banks of lakes or rivers.182  More-
over, after August 30, 2001, there is no lawful possession of land 
that is the “private property” of the state, which is a default catego-
ry that includes all land owned by the state that is not state public 
property.  These provisions also apply to acquisitive prescription 
under the Civil Code.183  The 2001 law, then, establishes state title 
as a default:  the state is the owner of land in Cambodia that has not 
been allocated to private applicants through grant or as a result of 
special acquisitive possession.184  Government officials may desig-
                                                          
181 Land Law, arts. 30, 32, 38 (2001) (Cambodia). 
182 Id., art. 16. 
183 CIVIL CODE art. 162(2) (Cambodia). 162.   
Prescriptive acquisition of ownership over immovable 
 
(1)  A person who peacefully and openly possesses an immovable for a 
period of 20 years with the intention of ownership shall acquire owner-
ship thereof. 
 
(2) A person who peacefully and openly possesses an immovable for a 
period of 10 years with the intention of ownership shall acquire owner-
ship thereof if the possession commenced in good  
faith and without negligence. 
 
(3) Neither paragraph (1) or (2) shall apply to any immovable property 
belonging to the state, regardless of its kind. 
 
184 Land Law, art. 12 (2001) (Cambodia). 
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nate state land simply by declaring that an area of land has not been 
occupied in accordance with the rule of special acquisitive posses-
sion. 
In principle, Cambodia’s Land Law provides incentives to tran-
sition to law through a Torrens system of title registration.  Success-
ful applicants for ownership on the basis of acquisitive prescription 
or special adverse possession receive a title that defeats unregis-
tered claims in the absence of fraud by the registered proprietor.185  
However, while approximately 1.2 million land titles were regis-
tered from 2002 to 2009 under a World Bank-funded program 
(LMAP),186 there has been incomplete coverage and exclusion of 
large numbers of landholders as a result of extensive government 
claims of state land, particularly in urban areas.  For example, a 
2009 survey of thirty-nine Phnom Penh communes titled under 
LMAP identified ten communities with 2,000 families that received 
land titles while 100 communities housing more than 10,000 fami-
lies did not receive titles.  The success rate for households claiming 
title was a strikingly low twenty percent.  A sample of twelve 
communities that did not receive titles concluded that eight had not 
been subject to titling simply because government officials had as-
serted that the land was state property.187  Another LMAP review of 
8,448 households in titling areas concluded that "a significant pro-
portion" of land disputes in Cambodia concerned State claims over 
currently occupied land, and that "in a number of these cases" the 
residents had good faith claims to title as lawful long-term posses-
sors.188 
The state claims approximately eighty percent of land in Cam-
                                                          
185 See Land Law, art. 65 (2001) ("The transfer of ownership can be enforcea-
ble as against third parties only if the contract of sale of immovable property is 
made in writing in the authentic form drawn up by the competent authority and 
registered with the Cadastral Registry Unit. The contract of sale itself is not [suffi-
cient] for the transfer of the ownership of the subject matter.”); see also CIVIL CODE 
arts. 134, 135 (Cambodia) (respectively limiting assertion of ownership against 
third parties to registered rights, and requiring registration for transfers of rights 
to have legal effect). 
186 WORLD BANK, IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT: LAND 
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION PROJECT XII (2011). 
187 Id. at xiiv. 
188 See MOHAMMED A. BEKHECHI & LARS LUND, CAMBODIA LAND MANAGEMENT 
AND ADMINISTRATION PROJECT: ENHANCED REVIEW REPORT (2009) (documenting 
findings about the implementation of the LMAP and the circumstances on the 
ground surrounding occupied land and evictions).  
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bodia as state land.189  It has granted economic land concessions of 
over fifty percent or more of all arable land, primarily to commer-
cial agribusiness interests, but also for commercial logging, mining, 
hydro-electric dams, special economic zones, and tourist resorts.190  
In the capital, Phnom Penh, there are more than 100,000 slum 
dwellers spread over 511 informal settlements.191  Some informal 
occupants have been in residence for decades.192  There are wide-
spread perceptions of de facto land ownership based on possession 
notwithstanding that Torrens rules limit legal ownership to regis-
tered title only.193  At times, there is a reluctance to accept offers of 
relocation or compensation by the state because of a perception of 
the unreliability of state promises.  There is a lack of serviced pri-
vate land in urban or peri-urban areas for poor households to obtain 
lawful residential title.  As is common with other informal envi-
ronments, there is regular use of documentation witnessed or grant-
ed by local government officials as a basis for informal markets in 
land.  Even those with registered title rarely register subsequent 
transactions or transfers of rights, as mandated by law, because of 
widespread preferences for local mechanisms of land administra-
tion.194 
Few landholders in Cambodia appear to coordinate property re-
                                                          
189 Cambodia - Land Management and Administration Project, 6, WORLD BANK, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/643811468770346842/Cambodia-
Land-Management-and-Administration-Project [https://perma.cc/4NLF-TFFP] 
(2002). 
190 See The Great Cambodia Giveaway: Concessions Over Time, LICADHO, 
http://www.licadho-cambodia.org/concession_timelapse 
[https://perma.cc/P69L-M6XN] (illustrating Cambodia’s “land grabbing crisis” 
through a timeline map showing land concessions granted by the Cambodian 
government from 1993 to 2013).  For further references on agrarian “land grabs” 
in Cambodia, see CAMBODIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION COMM., LOSING GROUND: 
FORCED EVICTIONS AND INTIMIDATION IN CAMBODIA 65 (2009). 
191 See Chhay Channyda & Abby Seiff, Phnom Penh’s slums swell in 2012, THE 
PHNOM PENH POST, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/phnom-
penh%E2%80%99s-slums-swell-2012 (Feb. 19, 2013). [https://perma.cc/RR6W-
RQ4A] (placing the growth of the cities’ slums in the context of a lack of titles in 
the city and land disputes in rural areas); see also PIERRE FALLAVIER, URBAN SLUMS 
REPORT: THE CASE OF PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA (2003) (setting forth the history of 
and statistics concerning slums in Phnom Penh). 
192 Channyda & Seiff, supra note 191.  
193 See UN-HABITAT, CHALLENGE OF SLUMS, supra note 16, at 222 (estimating 
that around 75% of unregistered landholders in Phnom Penh regard themselves 
as owners of the land). 
194 GRIMSDITCH & HENDERSON, supra note 78.  
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lations on the basis of law.  One study identified only a minority 
that understood the need to apply for ownership rights on the basis 
of possession prior to 2001.195  Many believed incorrectly that ob-
taining a receipt from local commune officials acknowledging their 
possession of land was sufficient evidence of legal rights of owner-
ship.196  A majority of landholders also invest in sales and other 
documentation signed or witnessed by local commune chiefs.  As a 
general rule, landholders are not even aware that their land is 
claimed as state land until local government officials announce a 
development project, or commercial representatives begin to erect 
fencing and other notifications of their economic land concession.197  
In a context of broad-based perceptions of corruption and illegiti-
mate land grabs by state actors, there is scant evidence of a social 
consensus that the state is the allodial source of title to land.  Yet 
there are resilient social beliefs that long-term possession creates an 
entitlement to land.198  Notably, these beliefs provide the basis for 
property sub-systems both in circumstances of illegality, where land 
is classified as state land, and where lawful landholders decline to 
follow mandatory rules of title registration. 
Cambodia challenges Demsetzian assumptions that hard-edged, 
state-centric land law induces adoption of law as a basis for proper-
ty relations where it provides optimal reductions in the transaction 
and information costs of property.199  Cases from Cambodia illus-
trate a range of property strategies despite bright-line law, not simp-
ly resort to law or efficient substitution of norms for law, but also 
selective enforcement of law by state actors and acts of resistance, 
                                                          
195 ADLER et al., LEGAL PLURALISM AND EQUITY: SOME REFLECTIONS ON LAND 
REFORM IN CAMBODIA 69, at 56 (2008). 
196 See Chi Mgbako et al., Forced Evictions and Resettlement in Cambodia: Case 
Studies from Phnom Penh 9 WASH. UNIV. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 39, 46 (2010) (“[D]ue 
to poor rights education among Cambodian communities, families who are eligi-
ble for legal ownership after five years of possession are often unaware of the pro-
cedure for claiming this right.”). 
197 See Collective Grievances over Land in Cambodia: A Study of Five Provinces 15,  
WORLD BANK (2004) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, COLLECTIVE GRIEVANCES] (noting a 
commune counsellor’s comment that the anger of villagers over the grant of an 
economic land concession for a term of 25 years resulted from a failure to com-
municate or give notice of the grant). 
198 Id. at 31. 
199 See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. 
PA. LAW. REV. 1095 (2007) (noting the interrelationship between the hard-edged 
character of property rules and acts of protest or resistance against property re-
gimes). 
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disengagement, and reluctant submission by private landholders.200  
Some landholders submit to claims of state title as a result of fears 
of conflict with powerful state actors.201  Others engage in acts of 
resistance through symbolic broadcasts of a capacity for violence—
a strategy designed to induce intervention by a powerful administra-
tive decision-maker.202  For their part, some administrative decision-
makers attempt situational resolution of conflict over land through 
decisions not to enforce claims of state title.203  Other local govern-
ment actors participate in hybridized mechanisms of property coor-
dination based both on physical possession and documentary re-
ceipts evidencing possession.  All these examples highlight 
strategic pathways for negotiating property where there are frag-
mented sources of public authority and social legitimation.  In this 
sense, they support a key finding of anthropological studies of legal 
pluralism—that property system fragmentation involves the co-
option and hybridization of coordination mechanisms across multi-
ple scales of private/public interaction.204 
                                                          
200 For examples, see WORLD BANK, COLLECTIVE GRIEVANCES, supra note 197. 
201 Id. at 16.  See also Mgbako et al., supra note 196, at 53–4, 56 (detailing how 
one community struggled to navigate the judiciary’s resistance to its concerns and 
a lack of government transparency). 
202 See WORLD BANK, COLLECTIVE GRIEVANCES, supra note 197, at 31 (describing 
two cases of resistance to claims of state land—involving projects for infrastruc-
ture (a reservoir) and commercial agriculture (irrigation)). 
203 See id. at 31 (In both cases described in the World Bank report, the provin-
cial Governor intervened to suspend the proposed project.  Yet, the state did not 
withdraw its claims of state title to land, leaving the landholders in a state of un-
enforced illegality). 
204 See, e.g., Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Forum Shopping and Shopping Fo-
rums, Dispute Processing in a Minangkabau Village in North Sumatra, 19 J. LEGAL 
PLURALISM 117 (1981) (describing hybridized private/public competition to re-
solve land disputes in West Sumatra); see also Camilla Toulmin et al., THE 
DYNAMICS OF RESOURCE TENURE IN WEST AFRICA 1, 11 (C. Toulmin et al. eds., 2002) 
(“[In Africa], tenure has remained embedded in social networks despite the inter-
vention of colonial and post-independence governments . . . We then see a net-
work of players forming around the state administration, seeking preferential ac-
cess and treatment, and making the land issue increasingly politicised.”).  The 
studies identify mutually constitutive interactions between private property and 
public authority: the mere act of authorizing certain rights to land constitutes a 
process of recognizing the authority of the decisionmaker.  See, e.g., Franz von 
Benda-Beckmann, Scapegoat and Magic Charm: Law in Development Theory and Prac-
tice, in AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF DEVELOPMENT: THE GROWTH OF 
IGNORANCE 127 – 30 (Mark Hobart ed., 1993) (discussing the methodological impli-
cations of applying certain models of law to a range of interaction settings).  For 
an overview of anthropological literature on relations between property and au-
thority, see Lund, supra note 131. 
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3.5.  The Paths of Property Systems 
 
The case studies of California, East Timor, Kenya, and Cambo-
dia provide insights into the comparative paths of property systems.  
Some property systems appear to align coordination mechanisms at 
spatial scales of interaction so as to reduce the total costs of access 
to resources.  A critical mass of resource users, transactors and po-
tential violators coordinate property relations on the basis of law, 
either because law aligns with local coordination mechanisms, or 
because law or the state induces alterations in equilibrium strategies 
of property coordination.  Other property systems experience misa-
lignments among coordination mechanisms where law attempts, but 
fails, to induce a critical mass of resource users, transactors or po-
tential violators to alter coordination strategies based on focal 
points outside of law.  The implication is that transitions to law-
based focal points for property coordination are critical junctures in 
the evolution of property systems. 
The Cambodia case highlights the historic significance of Euro-
pean-derived land laws that linked property with state sovereignty.  
Key principles of European land law—that ownership derives from 
or through sovereign grant, and that land ‘without a master’ belongs 
to the sovereign—were fundamentally disruptive of popular under-
standings of property in the subject territories of European coloni-
zation.205  European-derived land law imagines property 
                                                          
205 In civil law jurisdictions, the Regalian doctrine (and its equivalents) vested 
land that was not the subject of statutory grant by the sovereign in the European 
sovereign.  For example, in the Spanish Philippines, the Recopilacion de Leyes de las 
Indias vested all land “held without proper and true deed of grant” in the Spanish 
Crown.  Except for land reserved for public and common use, and after “distrib-
uting to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage,” all land was 
“free and unencumbered” for disposal by the Crown.  In the Dutch East Indies the 
1870 Agrarische Besluit (Royal Agrarian Decree) stated that all land not held under 
ownership (eigendom) rights fell within the domain of the State (Art. 1).  In the 
common law, “native” rights to land were not classified as estates held of the 
Crown at the time of sovereign acquisition.  Unless the land was deemed terra nul-
lius, “native” rights to land were classified as a permissive occupancy, or a per-
sonal right of usufruct, terminable at the will of the Crown and alienable to the 
Crown only.  For examples, see Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. U.S., 348 U.S. 279, 281 (1955); 
Calder v. Att’y Gen. of B.C., [1973] S.C.R. 313, 352– 353 (Can.); St. Catherine's Milling 
[1888] 14 App. Cas. 46, 54 (Can.); Sec’y of State for India v. Sardar Rustam Khan 
[1941] AC 356, 371 (PC); Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Sec’y of State for India [1924] LR 
51 Ind Ap 357, 360 (PC); Amodu Tijani v. Sec’y, S. Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 399, 403 (PC). 
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in abstract spatial terms, arranged by neatly stacked hierarchies 
of rights, and subject to overarching notions of sovereign authority.  
Yet, in too many contemporary contexts, the bright-line visions of 
conventional land law do not match the enduring reality of infor-
mal, semi-formal or illegal property sub-systems.  This article has 
identified a range of reasons for the emergence of this phenomenon 
of property system fragmentation—not only the distributional loss-
es of law and the coercive capacity of the state, but also the social 
embeddedness of possession and custom, and the salience and legit-
imacy of state legal order. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
The analysis has normative implications for the design of law.  
In standard economic analysis, law may provide optimal reductions 
in the information and exchange costs of property, and the social 
costs of resource competition, through standardized packages of en-
titlements derived from or through the state.  The focus on infor-
mation and exchange costs lies behind land laws that (1) mandate 
registration of titles or transactions, and (2) limit freehold proprie-
tary entitlements to titles derived from or through the state.  In rela-
tion to exchange, the hard-edged character of a rule of ownership—
as a standard package of entitlements derived from or through the 
state—facilitates valuation of entitlements, markets for capital and 
credit, and gains from trade.  In relation to information, the registra-
tion of titles or transactions by the state reduces the costs of deter-
mining what is being exchanged.  Merrill and Smith, in particular, 
highlight the information benefits of standardized property rules 
and entitlements.  The ex ante identification of permitted and pro-
scribed behavior reduces the costs of identifying, delineating, and 
understanding the entitlement subject to exchange.206 
The analysis suggests that land laws with a focus on information 
and exchange costs reduce the total costs of competition for re-
sources where there are expectations of legal enforcement by the 
state, or patterns of property coordination on the basis of law or le-
                                                          
206 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the 
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 34 (2000) (discussing 
how land laws may take on elements of “fuzziness” or complexity where gains in 
transactional efficiency outweigh increases in the cost of information). 
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gal order.  But where there are no expectations of enforcement by 
the state, and fragmented mechanisms for property coordination, 
land laws that focus on information and exchange costs may in-
crease the total costs of resource competition by increasing the costs 
of compliance with property across multiple scales of resource in-
teraction.  This suggests, in turn, that there is no “one-size-fits-all” 
property law for different social contexts.  The economic effects of 
law turn not only on information and exchange costs but on con-
text-specific conditions of property coordination.  Chronic circum-
stances of property system fragmentation thus support the conclu-
sion that a failure to adapt legal rules so as to support existing 
mechanisms of property coordination may increase the total costs of 
resource competition, notwithstanding reductions in the costs of ex-
changing and understanding property.  This normative conclusion 
will be explored in a separate work. 
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